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ABSTRACT 
 
Using secondary sources, the purpose of this thesis is to compare the two disasters 
– Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the two Christchurch Earthquakes in 
New Zealand and show how the countries managed the aftermath of each of the 
disasters. The thesis explores Esping-Andersen‘s concept of welfare typologies 
and shows where New Zealand and the United States fit into his framework. The 
thesis also reviewed some critiques to Esping-Andersen‘s typology.  It details the 
events of the disasters and how the respective governments responded given their 
social policy approaches.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On the 29
th
 of August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast of 
the United States and destroyed communities across more than 95,000 square 
miles of Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana.  Almost every levee in the city of 
New Orleans was breached, the lower parts of the city were badly flooded and 
around 1836 residents of the region were killed by the hurricane and its aftermath. 
Several weeks after the hurricane, social conditions in New Orleans worsened for 
those mostly poor black residents who had been stranded during the hurricane. 
Thousands of survivors were left in miserable conditions deprived of basic needs 
and provisions like food, water and medical care (Spencer, 2010). Seven years 
after this disaster, the issues for these people continue.  
The original intention of this thesis was to compare two disasters – Hurricane 
Katrina and the Christchurch Earthquake. Although the earthquake which struck 
Christchurch on 4
th
 September 2010 was by no means comparable in magnitude or 
impact to Hurricane Katrina, it was nevertheless a major disaster in the eyes of 
New Zealanders. As this thesis was nearly completed, a second major earthquake 
hit the city of Christchurch. On the 22
nd
 of February 2011, the city was hit by a 
6.1 magnitude earthquake that struck at a shallow depth during lunchtime, when 
Christchurch was at its busiest. The quake caused wide spread damage and 
multiple fatalities.   
Although Hurricane Katrina was much more devastating than the two earthquakes, 
on a relative scale; both disasters had overwhelming effects on the populations of 
the two cities.  However, while the earthquakes affected all socio-economic 
classes, Hurricane Katrina was particularly damaging for the poorest sections of 
New Orleans.  
Historically New Zealand‘s social policy had been underpinned by Keynesian 
economic policy and was upheld by succeeding governments until 1984 when 
there was a radical move away from social democratic principles towards ―a 
dismantling of the states overarching institutional involvement in health, 
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education and welfare‖ (Duncan, 2004, p. 180).  In contrast, the prevailing 
ideology of liberalism, individualism and personal responsibility have played a 
central role in shaping social policy in the United States.  
Using Esping-Andersen‘s concept of different types of welfare and Hurricane 
Katrina and the Christchurch earthquakes as case studies, the aim of this thesis is 
to explore how disasters are managed in two different countries with apparently 
different social policy approaches.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the events during and after Hurricane Katrina and the 
Christchurch earthquakes. Chapter 3  discusses Esping-Andersen‘s regimes, social 
policy in New Zealand and the United States. Chapter 3 tells the story of the 
actions the governments undertook to cope with the disasters. Chapter 4  analyses 
and compares the social policies of the United States and New Zealand and shows 
how their policy approaches impacted on the responses to the respective disasters.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
TWO DISASTERS 
 
This chapter focuses on how the two disasters unfolded and the responses of the 
respective governments to them.  The chapter will also include a sub-topic on 
FEMA‘s preparedness before and after Hurricane Katrina. 
Hurricane Katrina 
Prior to Katrina, writers had highlighted the possible dangers that awaited the city 
of New Orleans in the case of a hurricane. It was argued that a natural disaster 
could drown the whole city. ―A major hurricane could swamp New Orleans under 
more than 20 feet of water, killing thousands‖ (Fischetti, 2001, n.p.).  Fischetti 
(2001) went on to say: 
The city lies below sea level, in a bowl bordered by levees that fend off 
Lake Pontchartrain to the north and the Mississippi River to the south and 
west. And because of a damning confluence of factors, the city is sinking 
further, putting it at increasing flood risk after even minor storms (n.p).  
 
Mooney (2005) discusses the impact that a slow category 4 or 5 hurricane could 
have on New Orleans:  
It's possible that only those crows‘ nests would remain above the water level. 
Such a storm, plowing over the lake, could generate a 20-foot surge that 
would easily overwhelm the levees of New Orleans, which only protect 
against a hybrid Category 2 or Category 3 storm (with winds up to about 
110 miles per hour and a storm surge up to 12 feet) (Mooney, 2005, n.p). 
 
These predictions which came before Hurricane Katrina were an indication that 
the effects of a powerful hurricane could lead many non-evacuees to die, many 
more stranded and successful evacuees with nowhere to return to.  
By the 27th of August 2005, Katrina had crossed the southern regions of Florida 
and strengthened to a Category 3 storm and President Bush announced a state of 
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emergency in Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi. In addition, the statement 
proclaimed that the President‘s actions gave full right to the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to 
manage all disaster relief efforts (The White House, 2005). The statement also 
asserted that FEMA was authorized to identify, mobilize and provide, at its 
discretion, equipment and resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of the 
emergency and that 75 percent funding would be provided by the Federal 
government for protective measures and the removal of debris. 
With the hurricane approaching, the Director of the National Hurricane Center, 
Max Mayfield, highlighted the strength and devastation Katrina could cause. 
Mayfield claimed that Katrina was far more powerful than Hurricane Andrew, the 
previous Category 5 hurricane which hit Florida in 1992 killing 43 people. 
Mayfield (2005) stated that ―It's capable of causing catastrophic damage; even 
well-built structures will have tremendous damage‖ (n.p). On the 28th of August 
2005, Robert Ricks of the National Weather Service field office issued an urgent 
weather message that depicted how devastating Katrina could be.  He described 
Hurricane Katrina as rivalling the intensity of the 1969 Hurricane Camille. He 
added: 
Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks, perhaps longer. At least 
one half of the well constructed homes will have roof and wall failure. All 
gabled roofs will fail, leaving those homes severely damaged or destroyed‖ 
(n.p.).  
The report also emphasized that large amounts of debris from felled trees and 
telephone poles, wrecked cars, and collapsed buildings would be created and that 
there would be a lack of clean water.  
 
The President contacted the Mayor of New Orleans to make a public appeal to 
heed evacuation orders and warnings. Mayor Ray Nagin issued a mandatory order 
to evacuate the city on national television stating that ―We are facing a storm that 
most of us have long feared‖ (2005, p. 1).   
There were major issues that prevented the full evacuation of the city‘s residents. 
Despite the warnings, many people refused to evacuate the city claiming that their 
homes provided sufficient protection. Other reasons for the residents hindering a 
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full evacuation included their lack of transportation, their financial resources and a 
feeling of obligation by the residents to protect their property, others were elderly 
and could not evacuate by themselves. Another major issue was the lack of 
communication because of the damage to the infrastructure. Officials were unable 
to confirm which routes were closed and which were flowing freely (Wolshon, 
2004). 
Katrina was a Category 3 storm with strong winds and massive rainfalls and 125 
mph wind speed (205 km/h) when it made landfall near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana 
on August 29, 2005.   The heavy rainfall caused several lakes to rise, resulting-in 
significant flooding.  With the intense gales, several bridges were destroyed, 
including the Interstate 10 Twin Span Bridge that connects the city of Slidell to 
New Orleans (Knabb, Rhome & Brown, 2005). The hurricane caused a power loss 
for over 900,000 people in Louisiana and many more in nearby states (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2005). In Saint Bernard Parish, levees were breached and 
81 percent of the houses in the Parish were destroyed. In Saint Tammany Parish, it 
was estimated that about 70 percent of houses were damaged. In Placquemines 
Parish this figure was closer to 80 percent. (U.S. Department of Housing, 2006). 
The city of New Orleans suffered the most as Katrina passed. There were major 
power failures and 53 levees, including the Street Canal levee, the London 
Avenue Canal and the Industrial Canal were breached leaving 80 percent of the 
city under water. (Murphy, 2005). 
Many people were stranded in their homes. Unable to leave, survivors were 
trapped on rooftops waiting to be rescued. Some people made their way to the 
roof by using hatches and sledge hammers which they had been urged to keep in 
their attics in an emergency case but then became trapped in the attics and unable 
to escape as their houses succumbed to the rising flood. Around 1,100 people died 
in Louisiana as a result of the hurricane (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).   
Emergency Centres in Louisiana 
As part of the evacuation plan, a Sheltering Task Force led by the Department of 
Social Services and the Department of Health and Hospitals helped set up shelter 
areas throughout Louisiana. Major shelters were established along the evacuation 
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routes for both the general population and people with special needs. In the 
Superdome, the National Guard supplied 9,792 ready-to-eat meals and 13,440 
litres of drinking water (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).  In addition, The 
New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (RTA) began running transport services 
around the city to help people get to the Superdome. The RTA also had 10 
paratransit vehicles which ran from the Baton Rouge area to the Superdome for 
citizens with special needs.  Jefferson Parish also established shelter areas for 
people who could not evacuate. All evacuation services ceased at 7 p.m. on the 
28th of August 2005 due to worsened weather conditions (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2006). 
At 8am on the 28th of August 2005, the New Orleans superdome was designated 
as a mass shelter of ‗last resort‘ (Bytheway,2007). The superdome became a 
refuge for over twenty thousand disaster victims, while rescue teams worked 
continuously to accommodate the rising numbers (Landreneau, 2005).When 
Hurricane Katrina passed over New Orleans, it caused severe damages to 
electricity boxes and poles in the area causing a power loss to the City. In addition, 
the strong winds caused by the hurricane peeled part of the waterproof structure of 
the superdome allowing water to flow in to the building.  Shortly after, conditions 
in the superdome began to deteriorate (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).The 
situation led to the increasing urgency to evacuate the Superdome itself. On the 
1st of September, Kathleen Blanco, Governor of Louisanna, reported that the 
number of refugees had reached 25,000. By the evening the number had increased 
to around 30,000 as people desperately sought transport (Haygood & Tayson, 
2005). 500 buses were provided by FEMA during the evacuation process and  
evacuees were relocated across the state line to the Houston Astrodome (Frank, 
2005). The process of evacuating was very slow as buses stopped for survivors 
seeking help from the highway, and as they reached the Superdome, they were 
already filled with passengers.  
On the 31st of August, 2005, Blanco ordered a mandatory evacuation of all people 
remaining in New Orleans. 6,500 National Guard troops arrived in the city, and on 
September 2
nd
,  Blanco requested a total of 40,000 troops to assist with the 
evacuation and security in Louisiana. By September 3rd, 42,000 evacuees were 
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transported out of the city. Rescue operations began to focus on people stranded in 
hotels, hospitals and private homes (Penuel, Statler & Golsen, 2005). 
The Convention Center also became an emergency refuge for thousands of people 
fleeing their homes. The Center however, was not designated as a shelter and its 
official purpose was to serve as a bus stop to assist in the evacuation of the city. 
As the disaster progressed, police enforcement went door to door, encouraging 
people to leave their homes and gather at the center.  
During the onset of the disaster around 1000 people were delivered to the Center, 
where they awaited transport which never arrived (Haygood and Tayson, 2005). 
Given the scale of the disaster, the Convention Center was unsuitable due to its 
lack of security, no weapon screening and no food or water (Penuel, Statler and 
Golsen, 2011, p. 323).  Despite this fact, the Center was broken into on the 29th of 
August by victims who desperately sought refuge from the flood waters.  The 
National Guard estimated around 20,000 evacuees moved into the Convention 
Centre (Borger, 2005).  
Problems with evacuation 
The delivery of aid was deemed inadequate by local officials, victims and the 
media (Wombell, 2009, p. 15).  
On Tuesday the 30th of August, Mayor Ray Nagin suggested that the city had 
authorized the location, despite several officials being unaware that people had 
been sheltering there (Penuel, Statler and Golsen, 2011, p. 323). In Nagin‘s 
statement to officials ―the swelling crowd at the Superdome and the number of 
people needing shelter required us to open the Convention Centre as a refuge‖ 
(Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. 118). Mayor Nagin failed to inform 
FEMA, the state Emergency Operations Center, or the National Guard that he had 
opened the Convention Center to the public (Wombell, 2009, p. 66). According to 
Wombell (2009) ―although it served as a dry place of refuge, the people who 
congregated there were left on their own for a number of days‖ (p. 66). Being 
situated on one of the highest points in the city meant that the Convention Center 
remained above flood waters. However, the situation grew worse over the next 
four days with reports of looting, food and water shortages and ―horrific scenes of 
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murder and rape… where tens and thousands of people took shelter‖ (Wombell, 
2009, p. 15).  
According to Gilmore (2005), the only food the evacuees received in the three 
days following the storm came from looters who broke into stores in the 
neighbourhood (p. 1). By Friday, nearly 20,000 people were stranded at the 
Convention Center awaiting rescue (Gilmore, 2005, p. 1). Officials claimed that 
they did not know about the conditions in the Convention Centre until August the 
31st. According to FEMA chief Michael Brown,  
We learned about that (Thursday), so I have directed that we have all 
available resources to get that convention centre to make sure that they have 
the food and water and medical care that they need (Brown, 2005, p. 1).  
The relief process failed the majority of victims sheltering at the Convention 
Center. This assumption is based on the evident lack of communication and 
organization by FEMA relief workers. FEMA was offered help from the 
American Bus association and many other organizations, in order to carry 
evacuees from the Superdome and the Convention Centre, but no response came 
from FEMA as FEMA wanted to act individually (Sobel and Leeson, 2006).  
It was argued that the effort to evacuate would be hastened if school buses were 
used during the process.  According to the Select Bipartisan Committee Report 
(2005), the state found that one hundred school buses had not been used (p. 118). 
One of the main problems facing transportation was the fact that most bus drivers 
were unavailable. This is partly due to the fact that the majority was unwilling or 
otherwise unable to help with the evacuation. In addition, bus drivers were 
concerned about limiting the hours of service between rests. 
On the other hand, reports state that the New Orleans Police Department 
dispatched officers on Wednesday following the disaster, and delivered water to 
the Convention Center on several occasions, however, it is unclear as to whether 
or not police had passed the information on to the city or state emergency 
operation centres at this time. This indicates that response to the needs of those 
affected was slow in coming and poorly organized. Several days later, new 
shelters were opened to accommodate the growing numbers of flood victims. The 
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Louis Armstrong International Airport was reopened in order to allow flights to 
carry evacuees out of the city. 
According to Penuel et al., ―all problems were largely overstated by the media 
who questioned the availability of sufficient food and water supplies‖ (Penuel, 
Statler and Golson, 2011, p. 323). Public reports of civil disturbance (of which a 
large percentage were found to have been false) contributed to the need for an 
evacuation from the Superdome (Thevenot and Russell, 2005, p. 1). Additionally, 
news reports fuelled speculation regarding the official death count. 
In the aftermath of Katrina, it was revealed that far fewer had actually died 
in the superdome, and most of the fatalities were classified as due to natural 
causes‖ (Penuel et al., 2011,p. 323).  
Griffin (2008) criticizes the disaster response, stating that ―although Governor 
Blanco asked FEMA for aid … FEMA failed to provide the necessary support‖ (p. 
91).  
FEMA Preparedness 
FEMA is responsible for responding to any kind of disaster in the United States. It 
was established in 1979 as an official governmental agency after combining 
various disaster response committees.  
The primary mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is to 
reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, 
including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, 
by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive 
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, 
recovery, and mitigation (Barnes , 2008). 
One of the main reasons for establishing FEMA in 1979 was to respond to all 
kinds of disasters and link preparedness, response and mitigation within one 
organization (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). In 2002, President 
George W. Bush proposed that all terrorism preparedness functions be merged 
into FEMA‘s Office of National Preparedness and be managed within the 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. Instead, Congress chose to 
split preparedness functions between the Office of Domestic preparedness (ODP) 
and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (EP&R) (U.S. House 
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of representatives, 2006).  The main goal was to place terrorism preparedness in 
one organization and disaster preparedness in another. 
Hurricane Katrina caused more than 9,000 confirmed casualties and $96 billion in 
damage. ―Katrina is the first disaster-- natural or man-made-- to have damage 
totals almost reach the $100 billion mark‖ (The White House, 2006, p. 7).  The 
magnitude of the effects of Katrina resulted in the cyclone being branded as the 
deadliest and costliest natural disaster in American history. In the event of such 
tragedies, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the main 
respondent to restore and reduce future tragedies. However, FEMA was heavily 
criticized for its lack of action, slow response rate, and disorganized resolution 
plans. 
FEMA went through several transformations between years 2001 and 2005. The 
major transformation was the transfer of its responsibilities, personnel, resources 
and authorities to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, which 
is part of Homeland Security (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). After 
this transformation, the emergency management community complained that 
FEMA had been systematically dismantled, stripped of resources and authority 
and suffered from a lack of confidence because of the focus on terrorism by the 
Department of Homeland Security. 
It was clear that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the federal 
government were not prepared for the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina 
and the emergency management professionals questioned whether the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) and state preparedness for catastrophic events had 
declined due to organizational changes which resulted in reduced effectiveness of 
the response team towards Hurricane Katrina. 
Emergency management professionals highlighted the need of trained people, 
who have experience working together with their federal colleagues before a 
disaster strikes but because the Agency suffered cuts in the budget and staffing, 
many staff members were replaced by political appointments who did not have 
disaster management experience (Rood, 2005).. 
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The Christchurch Earthquakes 
On the 4th of September 2010, a 7.1 magnitude earthquake struck the Canterbury 
region of New Zealand. Two residents were seriously injured, one by a falling 
chimney and the second by flying glass. One person died of a heart attack suffered 
during the quake, although this was not directly linked to the earthquake. Mass 
fatalities were avoided partly due to New Zealand's strict building rules, and the 
fact that the quake occurred during the early hours of the morning when people 
were still asleep.  
On Tuesday the 22nd February, 2011, the city was shaken by a second earthquake 
of 6.1 magnitude.  Although this is not regarded as a particularly strong tremor, it 
was very shallow (5Km deep) which resulted in major structural damage and 
because it was a week day when many people were at work in the buildings, there 
were a number of fatalities and injuries with many people being trapped under the 
rubble of collapsed buildings .   
Less than an hour after the quake took place, the media began coverage of the 
disaster with broadcasts being shown around the country and the world. Collapsed 
buildings and debris filled the streets of the Christchurch City Centre, with reports 
that hundreds of missing people had been injured or killed. An immediate rescue 
mission was put into place to rescue those trapped within the city‘s collapsed 
buildings. In addition to the police, fire and ambulance services, the New Zealand 
army was deployed to help the rescue effort. Offers of specialist help from 
Australia, UK, USA, Japan, Taiwan, China and Singapore, were offered and 
accepted.  
Response and Emergency Management 
The earthquake caused major disruption and devastation within greater 
Christchurch. Communication was difficult due to severe damage to telephone 
and internet services.  
Within hours of the quake, a full emergency management structure was in place. 
New Zealand‘s Prime Minister John Key (2011) stated that 
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All civil defence procedures have now been activated; the bunker is in 
operation here in Wellington although it is only in limited contact with our 
people in Christchurch through both satellite and HF facilities (n.p).  
Civil Defence established a command centre in the Christchurch Art Gallery to 
monitor the damage and give daily reports to the media.   
On the day after the earthquake, Prime Minister John key informed the Minister of 
Defence, John Carter, that he should declare a state of national emergency under 
the Civil Defence Management Act 2002  (TVNZ, 2011). It was the first time in 
New Zealand‘s history that a state of national emergency had been declared as a 
result of a civil disaster. This declaration meant that the Ministry of Civil Defense 
and Emergency Management became the lead rescue agency and ensured the 
maximum possible level of co-ordination and co-operation between central and 
local resources and international assistance (TVNZ, 2011).   
The response by the New Zealand Government was immediate and effective, with 
many departments and ministries involved. Prime Minister John Key stated that, 
―The government is going to do everything it can to support the recovery and 
rebuilding of Christchurch‖ (Brownlee, 2011, n.p.).  The Prime Minister gave the 
Cabinet Minister Gerry Brownlee responsibility for the earthquake recovery role.  
Rescue teams from around the world arrived in Christchurch to assist the rescue 
process. Coming from United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Taiwan, China and 
Singapore, the rescue teams were involved in rescuing people trapped in collapsed 
buildings, responding to fires and working with structural engineers, seismologists, 
geologists and demolition experts. (New Zealand Herald, 2011). 
The New Zealand Defence Force also played a significant role with over 1400 
Army personnel being involved in the relief and rescue missions. They provided 
assistance with transport, evacuation, supplies and equipment shipments and aided 
police with security (New Zealand Defence Force, 2011). One hundred and 
sixteen soldiers from the Singapore Army who were in Christchurch, for training 
services at the time of the earthquake, assisted by manning the cordons around the 
city (New Zealand Defence Force, 2011). 
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The Christchurch police force was supplemented by staff and resources from 
around New Zealand. In addition, about 300 police personnel from Australia came 
to help the local force with regular duties, bringing the total number of police 
officers to 1200 (News centre, 2011). The police were involved in providing 
security cordons, organizing evacuations, and supporting the search and rescue 
teams. In addition, they helped to find missing people and to identify victims by 
providing forensic analysis and working closely with the Disaster Victim 
Identification (DVI) teams at the emergency mortuary set up  at Burnham Military 
Camp. DVI teams from Australia, United Kingdom, Thailand, Taiwan and Israel 
were also involved in this process to assure correct identification (News Centre, 
2011). 
The St. John Ambulance Service provided medical response to those injured, and 
triage stations were set up immediately. The Canterbury District Health Board 
gave priority to the victims of the quake, cancelling elective surgery outpatients 
and evacuating existing patients from the hospital to other centres. Those disabled 
and elderly people from damaged care facilities were evacuated to other regions 
(Observer, 2011).  As with the rescue teams, medical personnel from around New 
Zealand and from Australia flew into Christchurch to assist with the injured.  
Welfare Response 
Humanitarian and welfare support came from a number of agencies including the 
Red Cross and the Salvation Army as well as numerous other non-government 
welfare organizations. Welfare Centres and support networks were set up around 
Christchurch to shelter the victims. Four major centres were set-up as shelters for 
those victims of the earthquake who were  rendered homeless because of damage 
to their homes or who were unable to reach their homes due to roads being  
damaged and unusable. 
Casualties and Damaged Buildings 
The earthquake caused severe damage to public and commercial buildings and 
private residences in Christchurch.  
Two multi-story buildings, the Pyne Gould Corporation building  and the 
Canterbury Television (CTV) building, collapsed during the quake.  In addition to 
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the television station and a medical clinic, the CTV building also housed an 
English language institute.  A number of students from Japan, China, the 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Thailand and Korea as well as staff working in 
the two buildings were trapped and many were killed (AP, 2011). Many heritage 
buildings were declared dangerous and were given red-stickers after they were 
inspected.  This means that those building were deemed to be no longer safe for 
use and would have to be demolished in the near future. The spire of the 19th 
century cathedral was severelu damaged when the roof collapsed (NZPA, 2011).   . 
Demolition works on the Cathedral began in late March, 2012 and work  has 
started on the new cardboard building that will act as a temporary replacement for 
the Christchurch Cathedral (New Zealand Herald, 2012). 
The emergency stairwell of Christchurch‘s tallest hotel, the Hotel Grand 
Chancellor, was reported as unsafe and on the verge of collapse (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2011) .  The hotel was demolished in May 2012. 
Given the size, severity and damage caused by both disasters in the United States 
and New Zealand, Hurricane Katrina was much more devastating in magnitude 
than the Christchurch earthquake,  the economic impact of the earthquake was 
more significant, affecting nearly eight percent of New Zealand‘s national GDP 
(NHRP, 2012) compared to one percent of the US economy (Milken Institute, 
2005).    Additionally, while the effects of the hurricane were felt most strongly 
by the poor of New Orleans, the effects of the earthquake were felt across all the 
economic classes of Christchurch. 
To conclude, the initial responses to the two disasters differed in the degree to 
which the respective government were organised for such event.  
Chapter 3 will discuss Gosta Esping-Andersen‘s three welfare state capitalism 
typologies and where the United States and New Zealand are placed in these 
typologies.  The chapter will include reactions toward, and critiques of his 
argument.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND NEW 
ZEALAND 
This chapter discusses Esping-Andersen‘s analytical framework which I use to 
contextualize the United States‘ and New Zealand‘s approaches to welfare. The 
chapter will include critiques of, and reactions towards, Esping-Andersen‘s 
―Three states of welfare capitalism‖ and present the alternative conceptualizations 
of the welfare state that different authors have suggested. 
Esping-Andersen - Three Worlds of Capitalism 
In ―The Three worlds of Welfare Capitalism‖ (1990), Gosta Esping- Andersen 
argued that the then existing theoretical models of welfare were unsatisfactory and 
he offered new models that he argued were more consistent and also developed a 
framework through which to analyse them. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) argued that the levels of public expenditure on welfare 
(traditionally used to analyse welfare states) were inadequate and obscured ―an 
understanding of difference and cultural and institutional diversity‖ (Kennett, 
2001, p.78). In order to understand the diverse nature of welfare provision 
delivery and the varied character of welfare institutions in different countries, 
Esping-Andersen (1990) developed the concept of welfare regimes.   Building on 
Titmuss‘s (1968, 1974) work around the differentiation between the residual 
welfare model, the industrial achievement-performance model and the 
institutional redistributive model, Esping-Andersen‘s argued that:  
Contemporary advanced nations cluster not only in terms of how their 
traditional social welfare policies are constructed but also in terms of how 
these influence employment and general social structure.  The talk of a 
―regime‖ is to denote the fact that in the relation between state and economy 
a complex of legal and organizational features are systematically interwoven 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.2). 
Analysing the welfare regimes of 18 OECD countries Esping-Andersen used three 
key dimensions in his framework to identify the different ways that countries 
approached social policy: social rights, delivery responsibilities and distribution of 
resources.  
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Esping-Andersen built his argument on classical social policy writers such as 
Marshall (1950) who argued that the history of the welfare state involved the 
development of the provision of important social rights in conjunction with legal 
and political rights.   
Few can disagree with T.H. Marshall‘s (1950) proposition that social 
citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state…….Above, all it 
must involve the granting of social rights‖ (Esping-Andersen ,1990 p. 21). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all humans have a right to 
education and an adequate standard of living (UN General Assembly, 1948 
Articles 25 and 26).  However, there are many varied ways in which these rights 
can be met and countries differ, often radically, in terms of how much they 
support these social/human rights.  Not only was Esping-Andersen concerned 
with how different countries respond to core social needs, he also felt there were 
key differences in how these responses were met.   He argued that there were key 
differences in how the balance of responsibilities are distributed between the state, 
the market, the community and families or individuals and borrowing from 
Titmuss (1956) promoted the idea that welfare is not only a state responsibility 
but can, and is, delivered by private companies, voluntary organization, families 
and communities. 
Finally, Esping-Andersen maintained that the way social rights are perceived and 
responded to has a direct impact on the distribution of resources and he suggested 
that all social policies have an effect on the way in which different groups of 
people are placed within a society.   For example, a healthcare system that is 
mainly provided by the market (private companies) may provide better access to 
wealthy citizens, while one that is mainly provided by the state may result in 
equal access (Hudson, Kuhner, & Lowe, 2008). 
Using the three dimensions of: social rights, delivery responsibilities and 
distribution of resources, Esping-Andersen categorized the welfare state into three 
types which could be considered to belong on a continuum of liberalism: 
conservative, liberal and social democratic. 
The first type, the conservative or the ‗corporatist‘ regime exists in countries such 
Austria, Italy, France and Germany.  In this type of regime, there is a high level of 
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income protection but only modest redistribution of income between social classes. 
Nations that follow this regime are typically shaped by the Church and therefore 
strongly committed to the protection of the traditional family (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). 
Social insurance typically excludes non-working wives, and family benefits 
encourage motherhood. Day care, and similar family services are conspicuously 
underdeveloped; the principle of ‗subsidiary‘ serves to emphasize that the state 
will only interfere when the family‘s capacity to service its members is exhausted 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 27). 
The central element of these nations‘ economies is the free-market and social 
security operates as a savings bank against risks rather than encouraging equality 
(Hudson, Kuhner, & Lowe, 2008).   
In the second type, the liberal welfare state, ―means tested assistance, modest 
universal transfers, or modest social insurance plans predominate‖ (Esping- 
Andersen, 1990, p. 26).  Benefits are modest, and are directed mainly at 
individuals on low incomes and entitlements to benefits are often related with 
stigma.  
For economic efficiency, a successful economic performance is a top priority for 
liberal regimes. They seek to have a high economic growth rate and high levels of 
employment as well as a flexible labour market in which wages rise and fall in 
different sectors with labour being relocated according to demand (Goodin, 
Headey, Muffels & Dirven, 2003).  The market is encouraged in two ways, 
passively, that is by guaranteeing only minimum support, or actively, that is by 
subsidizing a private welfare system (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Inequality levels 
are significant in a liberal welfare regime as inequality is largely generated by the 
market.  
State intervention in a liberal regime is minimized due to de-commodification 
effects, a typical character of this typology, with much focus on the market and 
how it operates.  In addition, the system contains the realm of social rights, and 
works under the order of stratification, which merges relative equality of poverty 
18 
 
among state-welfare recipients, market-differentiated welfare among the 
majorities, and a class-political dualism between the two (Esping-Andersen, 1990).    
According to Esping- Andersen, the third type includes those countries designated 
as social democratic. In this regime, the social democrats pursue ―a welfare state 
that would promote an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of 
minimal needs‖ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 27). To ensure that this is attained 
Esping-Andersen stated that: 
This implied, first that services and benefits be upgraded to levels commensurate 
with even the most discriminating tastes of the new middle classes; and, second, 
that equality be furnished by guaranteeing workers full participation in the quality 
of rights enjoyed by the better-off (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 27). 
Reactions and Critiques towards Esping-Andersen’s typologies. 
Andersen‘s (1990) typologies can be seen as defining a common feature of a 
certain state but which is not necessarily fixed over a period of time.  Due to 
globalization and different political factors in some states, Peter Baldwin (1997) 
takes the term ―welfare state‖ more broadly and like Gosta-Esping Andersen 
identifies three broad types of welfare states (Jamrozik, 2001).  In addition, some 
writers suggested different typologies with different labels based on different 
dimensions.   Bonoli (1997) and Ferrera (1997) suggested the addition of welfare 
regimes like a ‗Bismarck or Beveridge‘ models and the ―Southern‖ approach. 
Jones (1993) and Kwon (1997) added an ‗East Asian‘ welfare type or the 
‗Confucian type‘ based on countries in East Asia. The ‗Antipodean‘ welfare 
regimes found in Australia and New Zealand are described in Castles and Mitchell 
(1993).  Some authors like Kasza (2002) rejected Esping-Andersen‘s welfare 
typology and argued that most countries 
practice a disjointed set of welfare policies due to the following typical 
features of welfare policy making (1) the cumulative nature of welfare 
policies, (2) the diverse histories of policies in different welfare fields, (3) 
the involvement of different sets of policy actors, (4) variations in policy 
making process, and (5) the influence of foreign models (Fenger, 2007, p. 
10) 
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Peter Baldwin – State and Citizenship in the Age of Globalisation 
Baldwin (1997) takes the term ‗welfare state‘ more broadly and identifies three 
other welfare regimes. Baldwin (1997) starts with the European model in which 
each country has a different role in dealing with their society, but the 
responsibility of social policy and the solution of any problems lie with the state. 
Charities and occupational effort have a minor role in society. 
The second type that Baldwin (1997) describes can be found in the newly 
emerging Asian countries where economic progress does not come with any 
visible growth of public welfare provisions. Those citizens who cannot obtain the 
necessities from the labour market are taken care of by their families and the 
institutions of these societies (Jamrozik, 2001). 
Peter Baldwin‘s third type is what he calls the ―in-between type‖ (1997) and 
parallels Esping Andersen‘s ―liberal‖ regime which is personified by the United 
States. Although liberal, Baldwin goes beyond  Esping-Andersen‘s welfare 
typology and explains that excellent health insurance and pension schemes in the 
United States favour those in employment, while those provision are absent to 
those who do not hold a place in the labour market (Jamrozik, 2001). 
Bonoli and Ferrera – Classifying Welfare States and the “Southern” model of 
welfare 
Giuliano Bonoli (1997) adds the ‗Mediterranean countries‘ (such as Italy and 
Greece) to the list of regimes  and is critical about the concept of de-
commodification, and claims that Esping-Andersen (1990) confuses issues about 
system generosity with ones about redistribution. Esping-Andersen (1990) tends 
to run together the distinction between national income maintenance systems in 
terms of levels of expenditure, with one in terms of the nature of the redistributive 
system used (Bonoli, 1997). Bonoli brings another version of redistribution using 
the names of two ‗founding fathers‘ of social policy:  the 19th century German 
Otto von Bismarck and the British policy adviser, William Beveridge, who was 
influential in the first half of the twentieth century.  In Bonoli‘s argument, 
Bismarck is seen as the key figure for the development of the conservative regime, 
developing a relatively strict insurance system where what people receive heavily 
depends on what they have put in. Similarly, William Beveridge supported the use 
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of social insurance but more as a way of paying attention to a person‘s ‗need‘. In 
his argument, Bonoli (1997) sees Beveridge as an influential person for the 
minimalist liberal approach that embodies the use of insurance principles and the 
more generous but need-oriented approach of the social democratic regime. 
Maurizio Ferrera (1996) argues for the addition of the ‗Southern model‘ (for 
example, Spain and Portugal) typology of social policy.  Ferrera focuses on four 
dimensions of social security systems: The policies of access, the regulations to 
financial social protection, the terms in which benefits are granted, and the 
organizational managerial arrangements to direct the various social security 
schemes (Ferrera, 1996). With these dimensions, Ferrera makes a comparison 
between the Scandinavian, Anglo- Saxon, Bismarckian, and the Southern 
countries. Speaking about the Scandinavian countries, he argues that on the basis 
of citizenship; people have the right to social protection and enjoy universal 
coverage for the risks of life (injury and unemployment risks for example). For 
the Anglo-Saxon states, Ferrera argues that those countries are characterized by 
highly ‗inclusive‘ social security coverage, but universal coverage is found only in 
the area of health care. Means-tested and flat rate benefits play an important role. 
For the countries described as the ‗Bismarckian‘ contributions from society have 
an important part in financing social security in which social insurance covers 
almost everybody. Finally, Ferrera (1996) discusses the social protection of the 
‗Southern countries‘ and states that some benefits in those countries are very 
generous and, based on citizenship, healthcare is institutionalized.  This means 
that a person must be a citizen of that state in order to enjoy benefits. Despite this, 
Ferrea (1996), states that, there is only little state intervention in the welfare 
sphere (Ferrera, 1996). 
Castles and Mitchell – Worlds of Welfare 
Francis Castles and Deborah Mitchell (1992) challenge Esping-Andersen‘s 
suggestion that decommodification has been a goal of social democratic parties 
and also challenge the idea of ―the expenditure-based orthodoxy that more social 
spending is the only route to greater social distribution‖ (Castles and Mitchell, 
1992). Castles and Mitchell disagree with Esping-Andersen about Australia and 
New Zealand and highlight that neither country meets his criterion of de-
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commodification where ―individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable 
standard of living independently of market participation‖ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
p. 37). Given that Esping-Andersen (1990) places the ‗Antipodeans‘ as 
representatives of the liberal regime, Castles (1993) points out that Australia and 
New Zealand have a more particular and more comprehensive approach to social 
protection than the standard liberal form, therefore representing a ‗fourth‘ model 
of social policy. Both Australia and New Zealand have an inclusive system of 
means-tested income support benefits and superannuation for the aged is universal. 
Means-test approaches exclude the rich, and may stigmatize the less-well off, but 
have fairly little direct effect on the income replacement right of the poor. 
Redistribution of income has been pursued through wage control and employment 
security. Income guarantees, realized by using market parameters, hence play a 
significant role in the institutional set-up of the ‗Antipodeans‘ (Arts & Gelissen, 
2002). 
Castles and Mitchell (1992) explain two main factors that led them to critique 
Gosta Esping Andersen.  First, they bring attention to the fact that political 
activities of the Left have played a major role in bringing equality in pre-tax, pre-
transfer income instead of depending on social policy for equality. Secondly, they 
speak about Australia, with relevance to the United Kingdom, and argue that 
Esping Andersen‘s approach ―disregards the potential for income-related benefits 
to make an effective contribution to redistribution‖ (Arts & Gelissen, 2002, p. 54). 
Castles and Mitchell describe Australian income maintenance as being fully 
means-tested, and does not resemble the liberal type welfare redistribution to the 
poor, nor have the universal social democratic and the ‗hierarchical solidaristic 
conservative‘ type mention in Esping-Andersen‘s ‗The three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism‘ (1990). This is the reason that Castles and Mitchell developed their 
four alternative welfare states: Liberal, Conservative, Non-right Hegemony and 
Radical (Arts & Gelissen, 2002). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
WELFARE IN THE USA AND NEW ZEALAND 
The United States 
The welfare system in the United States has been designed to protect citizens from 
any industrial hazard that could occur in a capitalist economy. There are a 
collection of welfare programs which include unemployment insurance, health 
insurance, old age pensions, accident insurance and support for families with 
dependent children. 
The United States continues to rely on a more intensive use of means tested 
(residual) form on one hand, and private market based insurance on the other 
(Myles, 1988). The difference between the ‗residual‘ and ‗institutional‘ welfare 
described by the British social researcher Richard Titmuss, comes close to what is 
traditionally understood by liberal social policy : public intervention occurs only 
after the two traditional sources of support –family and market- break down 
( Myles, 1988). 
Esping-Andersen categorized the United States as a liberal welfare regime 
because of the focus on the individual and the emphasis on efficiency rather than 
equity (Esping-Andersen, 1990). He stated that the United States does not 
contribute much of its public money to social programs but instead depends on 
social assistance targeted to those without jobs. Benefits are subsidized through 
universal taxation and are set below the minimum wage to encourage individuals 
to look for work. As a neoliberal regime, the United States pay benefits only to 
those who are considered deserving.  The market is the main source of welfare in 
the United States and has succeeded for three reasons: First, since the Second 
World War, living standards have risen due to the rapid increase in production of 
goods and services; second, the labour market has brought more ‗equality‘ due to 
what Goldin & Margo (1992) refer to as the ―great compression‖ of the 1940‘s 
and 1950‘s which brought a marked decline in wage inequality; and finally, the 
market became a source of income security. 
23 
 
The earliest example of welfare in the USA is the Poor Laws, which were 
imported to the colonies from Britain.  Making the distinction between the 
deserving and undeserving poor, those who were unable to work due to their age 
or physical health were assisted with cash or alternative forms of help from the 
government while those who were able-bodied, but unemployed, were provided 
with public service employment in workhouses.  
Throughout the 1800s there were attempts to reform the way government dealt 
with the poor with reformers advocating that the poor should be trained in morals 
and a work ethic in an attempt to move them into work and away from the need 
for assistance.   
The need for a more complete welfare policy in the United States began during 
the Great Depression in the 1930s, when it is estimated that, at its peak, a quarter 
of the labour force was unemployed resulting in many families suffering financial 
difficulties.  In 1935, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Social Security 
Act was enacted and established a number of programmes which provided support 
to various sectors of the population.  
By the 1960s some of the faults in this market driven-model were obvious. 
Groups such as the elderly, and some regions, for example, the Appalachia 
regions, had missed the rising tides of post-war prosperity and private social 
benefits had divided the labour market into two divisions – high salary workers 
who received generous social benefits and those who were on lower incomes with 
limited job security. In 1968, 4.1 percent of families headed by a woman received 
welfare assistance from the state. That percentage more than doubled to reach 10 
percent by the 1980s (David, 2000). 
Unhappy with the notion that individuals were taking advantage of the welfare 
system by not applying for jobs since it was not compulsory and that individuals 
with children could receive more aid and greater benefits if unmarried (Welfare 
information, 2010), the Republican initiated ‗Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act‘ better known as the ‗Welfare Reform Bill‘ was 
signed into law by Democrat President, Bill Clinton, on August 22nd 1996. 
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Throughout American welfare history, the government distribution of welfare has 
been closely related to cultural attitudes towards the poor. Americans have usually 
distinguished between the deserving poor and the undeserving poor. The 
deserving poor are those who are entitled to public assistance because they 
become needy through no fault of their own. The undeserving poor are those 
individuals who are responsible for their own plight and who can escape poverty 
by developing a strong work ethic (Katz, 1996). For much of history, in order to 
achieve the ―American dream‖, individuals have been encouraged to advance 
forward economically through working hard, and poverty is attributed to the 
moral failing of the individual himself (Lighter, 2008).  
In The American welfare system, this division between the deserving and the 
undeserving poor has translated into a division between social insurance and 
public assistance programs. Social insurance programs in the United States have 
been available to those who earn it through work. Social insurance programs 
include old age-pensions and the unemployment insurance (Lighter, 2008).  On 
the other hand public assistance, which includes aid to dependent children and 
general assistance for the needy, requires financial and moral evaluations of 
individuals that are applied before any financial aid is deserved. 
Benefits for public assistance are less generous than social insurance as the 
recipients of public assistance have often been seen undeserving of aid because 
they did not earn it through work. As a consequence, those people are 
disadvantaged because their benefits do not lift them out of poverty and remain 
far below from those who are paid through social insurance (Katz, 1996). Public 
assistance has thus carried a social stigma. 
Other sources for needy Americans other than the government are charitable and 
voluntary organizations. A broad spectrum of private charities and voluntary 
organizations are available in the United States. Volunteerism is on the rise in the 
United States, especially among retired persons. It is estimated that almost 50 
percent of Americans over the age of 18 do volunteer work, and nearly 75 percent 
of U.S. households contribute money to charity (U.S. Diplomatic Mission to 
Germany, 2009). 
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New Zealand 
Social welfare in New Zealand has long been an important component of New 
Zealand society. Benefits are provided by the state and financed by taxation 
(Fiscal policy) in order to help people in need. In addition there is occupational 
welfare which is distributed by industries as part of the employment in order to 
improve the efficiency of the workforce. Benefits in New Zealand include: State 
housing benefits for the ones in need, unemployment benefits, universal 
superannuation, family benefit such as the Working for Families package, single 
parent  benefits (DPB), health benefits and the legal minimum wage. 
Esping Andersen (1990) describes New Zealand as being a representative of the 
liberal welfare regime. However Castles (1998) claims that New Zealand has a 
more particular and a more comprehensive approach to social protection than the 
standard liberal form. The outcome is that New Zealand has the world‘s most 
comprehensive system of income support benefits and a large part of the 
population receives some benefits.   Income redistribution has been traditionally 
achieved through employment security and wage controls rather than social 
programs.  
New Zealand‘s traditional values lie in supporting people when they are in need 
and that support has been crucial in New Zealand since the 19th century.  New 
Zealand had developed a comprehensive welfare state in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s 
and was known for its social experimentation. But more recently, New Zealand 
has taken welfare reform based on free-market principles and economic 
rationalism much further than any European countries.  
New Zealand is a bi-cultural country which was founded on the Treaty of 
Waitangi between the British colonizers and the indigenous Maoris in 1840. 
Although the Treaty of Waitangi ceded a dominant position to the British crown, 
it ensured Maori its continued position and authority over land and property, and 
gave Maori the rights and privileges of British subjects (Davey, 2001). The 
growing number of British settlers in New Zealand in the nineteenth century, 
made the Maori a minority in their own country, and by the year 1880 the ‗British‘ 
culture came to dominate the nation. 
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The development of welfare in New Zealand has been strongly influenced by the 
country‘s history and geography. New Zealand‘s approach to welfare rests on 
guaranteeing minimum levels of social protection to those who meet certain 
conditions. Access to some benefits is universal, such as health care, education 
and aged pension while others are means-tested. Means-tested benefits guarantee 
a minimum income level for those who are employed but who are in need of 
assistance by the state.  The welfare and well-being of people in New Zealand is 
also associated with acknowledging the dignity and rights of individuals. This 
includes extending benefits to people on the basis of their membership of the 
human community, or a membership of a particular political community such as 
citizenship rights (Cheyne, O‘Brien, & Belgrave, 2008). Social security in New 
Zealand emphasizes the right to a benefit based citizenship, while income support 
and social assistance are based on individual assessment in which the recipient is 
defined as a consumer with needs. 
Social policy in New Zealand, took different innovative approaches and directions 
at certain periods, that led authors like Professor Ian Shirley (2012) to describe it 
as a ‗Social Laboratory‘(p. 1).  Assisting people in need lay in the traditional 
values of New Zealand and has been crucial since the 19th century.  Social Policy 
regime in New Zealand has been based primarily on a mixture of the residualist 
and rights based- models, therefore the contributory principle has remained weak. 
(Boston, Dalziel & St John, 1999). 
New Zealand became a self-governing democracy in 1853 and by 1893, was the 
first country in the world to grant universal suffrage for women (Shirley, 2012). 
By 1898, New Zealand introduced the old-age pension, and in the 1930‘s, The 
First Labour government of Michael Joseph Savage, re-organized the welfare 
state and created the first housing scheme. Health and Family assistance policies 
were universal and generous especially in the immediate post war period.  
Education Funding in New Zealand has been Universal in character (Boston, 
Dalziel & St John, 1999). But some of government‘s approaches to income 
maintenance at that time had a degree of means testing like the family rebate, 
domestic purpose benefit etc. By the 1950s and 1960s, New Zealand has 
developed a comprehensive welfare state, but by the 1970s when Britain forged 
closer links to the European community, New Zealand‘s role as a ‗British farm in 
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the Pacific‘, had to undertake some major transformation in the economic 
structure (Shirley, 2012).  
The value of foreign trade declined, and there was an increasing gap between the 
export receipts and the import prices due to factors like the oil crisis in 1973, and 
overseas governments who wanted to protect their productive sectors. In response, 
some of the import controls were lifted and the economy was slowly opened to 
overseas competition in order to strengthen the export potential of the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors. Industries in the country were re-organized through 
mergers, takeovers and amalgamation, but despite this, production units were still 
small. The family wage set by the government dropped and led to major 
transformation in the demographic pattern. Households, including women, had to 
find ways to expand their household incomes through working multiple jobs and 
part-time employment. According to Shirley (2012, p. 1): 
Social policy at this time was characterized by incrementalism. There was a 
continuing commitment to full employment, (at least in the rhetoric of 
government) and a belated attempt to address the falling value of the family 
wage through a freeze on prices and wages.   
In 1972 a Royal Commission on Social Security was established and a review 
which concentrated on the extent, adequacies and levels of various benefits 
available to those deemed to be in need was published. This report was written in 
what later was recognized to be the quite exceptional circumstances of the post-
war economic boom. This boom in the developed industrialized democracies 
resulted in rising productivity levels, based on continuing low inflation, economic 
growth and increased social spending. (Marglin and Schor 1990; Glynn et al. 1992, 
Royal Commission 1972: 6-7).  
In those circumstances the Commission recommended that there should be a 
substantial increase in a benefit system as a whole, which would allow 
beneficiaries to enjoy a standard of living ‗much like‘ that of the rest of the 
community and which would enable them to participate in and belong to the 
community (Royal Commission 1972:65). This was regarded as both socially 
acceptable and fiscally affordable (Barnes & Harris, 2011, p.1). 
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Not long after the Commission released its report, the economic boom came to an 
end and since the early 1980s as a result of fiscal pressures, lower economic 
growth, growing unemployment, an ageing population, increasing demands for 
health and education services coupled with public concern over welfare abuse and 
fraud and opposition to rising average tax rates, support for the welfare state has 
been waning.  This dissipation of support has also been reflected in the shift to 
market liberalism and neo-conservatism.  From the early 1990s the various centre-
right governments of New Zealand have undertaken radical changes in their 
approaches to social policy and while the welfare state has not been dismantled, it 
has been substantially altered. 
After the defeat of Muldoon‘s National Government in 1989, the Labour 
Government brought in major economic reforms claiming that Muldoon‘s 
economic management brought the country to the brink of collapse (Cheyne, 
O‘Brien, & Belgrave, 2008). Based on the ‗Pain before gain‘ theme, the delivery 
of social objectives was minimized, and the movement towards liberalization 
became more apparent.  
During the early 1980s, the United States and the United Kingdom made a move 
towards liberalizing the economy and cutting costs on welfare. Those societies 
based their ideas on ―hawkish anti-Soviet jingoism and an appeal to traditional 
values‖ (Cheyne, O‘Brien, & Belgrave, 2008, p.36). Headed by Prime Minister 
David Lange, the New Zealand Labour government, while socially liberal was 
economically neo-liberal and pursued economic policies similar to those of 
Thatcher and Reagan, claiming that it was the key to sustainable social diversity.  
The neo-liberals wanted to reduce the power of the state and encourage a free-
market, as competition in a free-market society would create a dynamic and 
efficient society, and reduce the dependency of the welfare state.  The Labour 
government wanted to contain the power of the state in the names of industrial 
democracy, community development and iwi sovereignty (Cheyne, O‘Brien, & 
Belgrave, 2008). 
Moving towards the marketization of government, the Labour government which 
came to power in 1984, made dramatic economic policy reforms. Exchange 
controls were lifted completely and tariffs and regulation were reduced or 
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eliminated. The government was to be made responsive to the market and many 
state sectors were reconstructed. Agricultural grants were withdrawn and 
commercial activities were frequently placed in a new corporate structure known 
as the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) (Cheyne, O‘Brien, & Belgrave, 2008). 
In the 1990 election, the National Party and Labour Party policy differences were 
not extensive. Jim Bolger led the National Party and defeated the Labour Party in 
a landslide victory. The National government basically continued Labour‘s 1984 
strategy in reforming the state, continuing the market reform process and cutting 
government spending. In response to the deficit and fiscal crises of the 1990s, the 
government announced benefit cuts as an emergency measure (Cheyne, O‘Brien, 
& Belgrave, 2008).  The 1991 budget provided a systematic reform package 
aimed at reducing government spending. The reforms were aimed at reducing 
dependency on the state, creating a modest safety net and eliminating the 
suggestions of universal access to welfare. 
Reduction of welfare spending by the government in 1991 caused the creation of a 
new residual welfare to be reformed by the free market.  The government aimed at 
transferring health and welfare services to the private sector and to lessen an 
individual‘s reliance on the public sector. It was argued that transferring those 
services to the private sector would create competition which in turn would ensure 
efficiency of the services provided and reduce costs. State housing was no longer 
state funded as the government made policies to house the less well-off through 
income subsidies. 
By the early 1980s the bulk of social spending, including health care, education 
and some forms of income maintenance, were largely non-means tested (Boston, 
Dalziel & St John, 1999). The spending for social services continued until 1983, 
when the country experienced rising levels of unemployment and slow economic 
growth that led the government to make significant changes in the welfare system. 
The fourth Labour government (1984-1990) imposed a great degree of targeting 
on some of the benefits. For example, a tax surcharge on Superannuation was 
introduced in 1985 and Student Allowances for 18 and 19 year olds was means 
tested from 1989 (Stephens, 1990). Despite the targeting of some forms of income 
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maintenance, the Labour government rejected the Treasury proposals for cutting 
social expenditure and making some forms of social assistance means-tested. 
 By the 1990s a newly led National Government embarked on a major 
transformation of most aspects of the welfare state, leading to the emergence of a 
new conservatism. The National Government reduced public expenditure, causing 
significant cuts in most of the welfare benefits. Targeting approaches were 
significant in education, health and income maintenance and major changes to the 
ways social assistance was delivered, particularly in healthcare and housing. 
National claimed that the margin between the benefit rates and wages was too 
small and made those on the benefit have little incentive to look for jobs, therefore 
the only solution was to reduce benefit rates (Boston, Dalziel & St John, 1999).  
National was committed to the fact that the government should keep itself out of 
the lives of individuals and that the ‗free-market concept‘ would create 
competition and create more jobs. It argued that people who could not meet their 
own needs should be supported by the state through a ‗modest safety net‘ (Shipley, 
1991). 
After the loss by the National Party against the Labour Party in 1999, the Labour 
Government, led by Helen Clark, cautiously gave way to a new form of social 
democracy. In a time of economic boom and full employment, the Labour led 
government increased state spending and stressed a partnership model rather than 
competition between the public, private and voluntary sectors. However, self-
reliance and employment were to remain as an important aspect of well-being. In 
response to these policies, the National party in opposition 
moved further to the centre, with key policies that differed little in substance 
from those of the Labour-led government (Cheyne et al., 2008, p. 16).   
Despite this return to social democracy, there were significant contrasts between 
this contemporary form of social democratic values, and the traditional ones of the 
pre-neo-liberal era (Cheyne et al., 2008). The emphasis here was to reduce 
benefits and redistribute resources to the people that deserved it.  Labour ensured 
that the surpluses generated by the government were to be redistributed, 
something deeply rooted in New Zealand‘s social policy history. For example, in 
2003, the government ensured that an aging population could receive a state-
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supported income into the future by redirecting a proportion of the surpluses to a 
superannuation fund. In 2004 the redistribution of income encompassed low and 
middle income families not dependent on the benefit through a flagship program.   
In 2005, the Labour Party won the election for a second term and continued its 
commitment to redirecting government surpluses to those in need. Those policies 
of assisting individuals in need stood against National‘s policies of providing very 
substantial reductions in personal taxation. The election according to Cheyne 
(2008)  
was notable for the adjustments being made on the Centre right, still having 
difficulty readjusting to the electoral success of the Third Way government 
(p. 40).   
In 2006, National Party leader Don Brash stepped down from the leadership and 
John Key, Finance Spokesman at that time, was elected to take his place. 
In 2008, under John Key‘s leadership, National won the election against the 
Labour Party, which had served three terms in power. John Key promised his 
centre-right coalitions, ACT, United Future and Maori that he would deliver to 
New Zealanders strong, stable centre-right values. The current National Party 
vision to New Zealand is to ― seek a safe, prosperous and successful New Zealand 
that creates opportunities for all New Zealanders to reach their personal goals and 
dreams‖ (National, 2012, p. 1).  National believes that this vision will be achieved 
through building a society based on loyalty to the country, national and personal 
security, equal citizenship and opportunity, personal responsibility, individual 
freedom, competitive enterprise and rewards for achievement, limited government, 
strong families and communities, and sustainable development to the environment 
(National, 2012). 
The consequences of the move to a market focused economy 
A key feature of both economic and cultural globalization is the global spread of 
specifically neoliberal forms of governance characterized by an international and 
patterned move in the direction of increasing marketization, a redrawing of the 
public/private distinction, valorisation of possessive individualism, and decreasing 
state spending in social arenas. Most notable in the case of welfare state 
restructuring in countries like the United States and New Zealand is "a strategy of 
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deregulating wages and the labour market, combined with a certain degree of 
welfare state erosion" (Esping-Andersen, 1996, p.10). 
Neo-Liberals are opposed to the provision of services by the state.  They claim 
that those services ―do not offer the consumer the responsiveness and choice that 
is associated with a well-functioning market‖ (Cheyne, O‘Brien, & Belgrave, 
2008, p. 81). In addition, the welfare state is viewed as a cause of many of the 
economic difficulties faced by most Western industrialized nations since the 
1970s. This is because, the money that is given as a benefit, can otherwise be 
invested for industrial purposes. This is return, will sustain economic growth and 
create more jobs.    
On the other hand, neo-liberals do not reject the state intervention entirely. The 
state has the responsibility to ensure the rules that exist for the smooth operation 
of the market, are functional in a way that does not discriminate in its treatment of 
individuals and mechanisms are needed for dealing with breaches of such laws, 
and for solving problems and disputes that could occur between actors in the 
market-place (Hayek, 1973).  For Hayek (1973), through giving charity and 
voluntary work , the market can be corrected, and the only form of welfare should 
be limited to a provision of a safety net and must not be seen as a right to those 
who are in need for a assistance.  
To conclude this chapter the United States originally adopted and still follows the 
classical liberal model of social welfare and social policy which depends very 
much on the market.     New Zealand‘s approach of the early 20th Century which 
led to it being regarded as the ―model welfare state‖ changed  dramatically due to 
the fiscal pressures that caused lower economic growth, higher unemployment, an 
ageing population, increased demands for education and health and changing 
family structures (Boston, Dalziel & St John, 1999).  These pressures resulted in 
an approach to social welfare and social policy that is closer to that of the United 
States.     
It is these approaches that dictate the ways in which the disasters of Hurricane 
Katrina and the Christchurch earthquake are managed by their respective regimes.  
The next two chapters of this thesis discuss the responses of the U.S and New 
Zealand governments to the disasters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RECOVERY PROCESS – NEW ORLEANS 
 
Every country in the world is susceptible to a disaster, no matter how big or 
devastating it could be, where and when it will happen, they will occur. When a 
disaster occurs, societies anticipate that their governments will aid the state and 
local agencies to quickly respond to ease the effects of the disaster and to ensure 
the immediate safety and welfare of the community. But what happened following 
Hurricane Katrina was completely different. At the time of Hurricane Katrina in 
2005, there was a great deal of criticism regarding the slow response to the 
disaster, and at the time of writing this thesis in 2012, the city is not fully rebuilt 
due to unfulfilled promises by the government especially to those low-income 
citizens who were disproportionately affected.  
In contrast the response to the Canterbury earthquake emergency was far more 
efficient and immediate and according to an American earthquake expert Dan 
Dyce (2010), ―in fact much better than what occurred after the 2005 Katrina 
hurricane in New Orleans‘‘ (n.p.).    
This Chapter outlines the recovery process of both the United States and New 
Zealand and how each government managed the disasters. This chapter will cover 
selected areas of social policy (health, housing and business recovery) to highlight 
the extent to which the respective governments were involved in restoring the 
lives of their citizens within these areas of social policy. 
New Orleans, United States 
Housing  
Hurricane Katrina created a housing crisis of historic magnitude. When the 
hurricane hit the Gulf Coast, thousands of people were displaced from their homes. 
Tens of thousands of homes in New Orleans were destroyed or severely damaged 
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by the winds and the storm surge. Floods created by the breach of the levees led to 
the flooding of many houses.  
Even before Hurricane Katrina hit, greater New Orleans was one of the more 
troubled metropolitan areas in the nation. Sharp racial segregation and high 
concentrations of poverty, decentralization, and a slowing economy all challenged 
the region (Brookings 2005, p. 2 ). 
The population comprised 75 percent African American and the Impact of the 
storm on these vulnerable families was painfully evident when news coverage of 
the overcrowded Superdome and the city‘s flooded streets exposed the poverty 
and vulnerability of its residents.    
Black people and poor people bore the brunt of the devastation because—for the 
most part— they lived most often in the lower-lying, more flood-prone sections of 
the city, such as Mid-City or the Lower Ninth Ward or as the Louisiana State 
University geographer Craig Colten observes:  
With greater means and power, the white population occupied the better-
drained sections of the city, while blacks typically inhabited the swampy 
`rear‘ districts (Brookings 2005, p. 13). 
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Map 1: Hardest hit areas (Taken from: The Brookings Institution, 2005, p. 18). 
Housing conditions before Katrina  
Compared to the national average, home ownership in New Orleans was low (47 
per cent compared to 67 per cent) prior to the hurricane.  Like most large cities in 
the United States, affordable housing and excessive housing costs were an issue.   
Over half of households with very low incomes were paying over half of their 
income on housing. The majority of owners and those who rented were equally 
disadvantaged in respect of the burden of housing costs. 
The small number of households that received federal housing assistance were 
also living in ―some of the nation‘s worst public housing‖ (Popkin, Turner & Burt, 
2006, p. 2). 
The authority that was responsible for providing houses for low-income residents 
is the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) which according to the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had been one of the 
worst performing housing authorities for more than 30 years (Fosberg, Popkin & 
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Locke, 1996) and at the time of the hurricane had been put into HUD (Housing 
and Urban Development) receivership.  In 2005 the Housing Authority of New 
Orleans had 8,421 public housing units and 9,560 Housing Choice Vouchers. The 
Housing Choice Voucher Program is a federal program provided by the United 
States Department of Housing: 
to assist low-income families, the disabled and the elderly, to afford decent, 
safe and sanitary housing in the private market……A family that is issued a 
housing voucher is responsible for finding a suitable housing unit of the 
family‘ choice where the owner agrees to rent under the program…..A 
housing subsidy is paid to the landlord directly by the PHA on behalf of the 
participating family (United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2010). 
Historically, most of the city‘s public housing projects were based in low-income 
neighbourhoods, separating low-income residents from other residents of the city. 
This resulted in a worsening of racial segregation and a concentration of black 
poverty. The authority‘s neglect and mismanagement over a long period left these 
developments in ―severe distress‖ (Popkin, Turner & Burt, 2006, p.3).  For 
example, the residents living in projects like Iberville, Florida and Desire suffered 
not only poor housing but also high levels of violent crime, drug trafficking and 
other social problems (Popkin, Turner & Burt, 2006). 
When Katrina hit New Orleans, the area downriver from the industrial canal in 
New Orleans was completely flooded. This particular area, the Lower Ninth Ward, 
was the home of a mostly African American, low-income, working class 
community of nearly 12,000 inhabitants. Prior to Katrina, with a poverty rate of 
28 percent, this community‘s the unemployment rate was 11 percent and 17 
percent of the households were receiving public assistance (United States Census 
Beareu, 2004). However, unlike most high-poverty neighbourhoods, nearly 62 
percent of the residents in the Lower Ninth Ward were home owners. Many of the 
houses in the Lower Ninth Ward were uninsured because FEMA had zoned it as a 
low risk area. The area sat on higher ground protected by the levees, so lenders 
did not require their clients to buy flood insurance (Whoriskey, 2005). However 
after Katrina, these low-income families lacked the ability to rebuild their homes. 
Table 1 represents a profile of the residents of the Lower Ninth Ward of New 
Orleans prior to the hurricane 
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Average Family Income $37,214 
Population 12,008 
Poverty Rate (%)        28 
Child Poverty Rate (%)        41 
Share of the population that is Black (%)        92 
Share of the population that is White (%)          7 
Unemployment Rate (%)        11 
Share of household with public assistance income (%)        17 
Share of 25+ population with a high school diploma (%)        78 
Share of 25+ population with a college degree (%)        16 
Proportion of families and subfamilies with own children who are 
female-headed (%)  
       50 
Share of adult population that is over 65 (%)         22 
Share of units occupied by owners (%)        62 
Share of people occupied by renters (%)        32 
Vacancy rate (%)        11 
Share of Owners-occupied units with Mortgage (%)        52 
Table 1:  Profile of the Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans before Hurricane 
Katrina.    (Source: United States Census Bureau, 2004). 
Housing after Katrina  
 Katrina caused the largest displacement of people ever seen in the United States, 
forcing more than a million people out of their homes in Louisiana and 
Mississippi. 
 
Photo 1- An Abandoned House in the Lower 9
th
 Ward, New Orleans. (Photo by Jo 
Barnes 
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Photo 2- Photo depicting the heavy damage to houses caused by aftermath Katrina 
in the Lower 9
th
 Ward, New Orleans (Photo by Jo Barnes). 
 After Hurricane Katrina poor households faced urgent problems, trying, without 
work or income, to find a place to live in different communities. In addition, there 
was no clear plan for housing these poor families when thousands of other 
evacuees remained in hotels and temporary housing situations. People who moved 
out of hotels lived in a mixture of arrangements, including trailers, temporary 
apartments in other cities and doubling up with family, friends and in some cases 
strangers.  
On October 6th, 2005, the House of Representatives approved a set of waivers for 
displaced families with existing Housing Choice Vouchers, endorsing the 
important role that housing vouchers have for placing people into more permanent 
living arrangements (Sard & Rice, 2005).This new plan had two parts. First, the 
displaced homeowners and renters were eligible to receive rental housing 
assistance through FEMA‘s Individuals and Households Program (IHP) once 
FEMA had identified that their original dwelling was unfit to live in and other 
criteria had been met. For those who homes were severely damaged, especially 
those from the coastal counties, an immediate cash payment of $2,358 to cover 
three months‘ rent was paid. More than 400,000 families received payments from 
FEMA two weeks after announcing the new plan. (FEMA, 2005).  
The second part of the plan addresses the housing needs of the relatively few 
households that were living in HUD-subsidized housing or were homeless before 
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the disaster. Those families received rental housing vouchers for 18 months under 
a temporary HUD program called the Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance 
Program (KDHAP). This benefit had the same administrative structure as the 
Housing Choice Vouchers but was less generous since it did not include a 
allowance for utilities nor could it be used move to a new jurisdiction (Sard & 
Rice, 2005).  
Low-income and unsubsidized renters, whose homes had been damaged or 
destroyed by the catastrophe, faced confusing choices (Katz, Liu & Fellowes, 
2005).  In the short term, FEMA housed those people in shelters, hotels and cruise 
ships. 
FEMA‘s initial response after the disaster was to order and deploy trailers for 
those who found themselves homeless. FEMA‘s announcement that it had ordered 
300,000 trailers and would create villages of as many as 25,000 households in 
rural areas was widely criticized (Sard & Rice, 2005).    
―The prospect of several hundred poor families isolated together in trailer 
camps removed from transportation, jobs, schools, health care, and shopping 
provoked a widespread objection across the political spectrum‖ (Crowley, 
2005, p.129). 
Poor evacuees sent to isolated trailer parks risked being even worse off 
economically than they were before the flood destroyed their communities.    
Another attempt by FEMA was to provide homeowners with trailers and place 
them on their own properties while they rebuilt. This approach was met with 
criticism and resistance by some parish governments in Louisiana and by 
neighbours in New Orleans (Sard & Rice, 2005). The problem with trailers is they 
are structurally unstable for hurricane affected areas and according to Mississippi 
Governor Haley Barbour (2006), ―they do not even provide the most basic 
protection from high winds and severe thunderstorms‖.  
Although trailers had to be part of the solution in areas with acute housing 
shortages, FEMA soon backed off its reliance on trailers as the preferred 
temporary housing choice (Crowley, 2005, p.129) 
Additional to the difficulties of coping with the results of Katrina, homeowners 
with mortgages faced an additional problem, particularly if their homes had been 
40 
 
rendered uninhabitable. The three-month grace period granted to homeowners 
with mortgages ended on December 1st, 2005, so that mortgage holders were 
liable for their monthly payments. HUD announced that it would provide 
mortgage assistance for up to 20,000 households with FHA-insured mortgages—
but only if their properties could be rebuilt, if they had enough insurance or 
personal resources to complete the rebuilding, and if they were employed or very 
likely to return to work (United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2005). Other homeowners would have no choice but abandon their 
homes altogether, losing whatever equity they had and leaving the mortgage 
lenders with large losses.  
The response to the short-term housing needs of Katrina evacuees was very 
different to the way the government dealt with the 1994 Northridge earthquake 
when more than 10,000 low-income families were left homeless. HUD led a 
coordinated effort with both federal and local agencies and issued thousands of 
emergency Housing Choice Vouchers.   They also provided assistance in finding 
housing for the displaced households and within weeks, all evacuees had been 
moved into permanent apartments (Popkin, Turner & Burt, 2006). 
Many displaced people from the Gulf Coast evacuated to different states. The 
increased demand for affordable housing resulted in the increase in rent prices 
around the country which made poor-income families even more vulnerable.  
Many of those who had moved to Texas were unable to rent the vacant homes 
because the rent was more than they could afford and there were no housing 
vouchers to help them bridge the gap between what the housing cost and what 
they could afford (Crowley, 2005). 
With new businesses and entire industries developing, with the aid of generous 
tax incentives, the business district of New Orleans shows little evidence of 
Hurricane Katrina.   
In 2010 an article by Scott Cohn (CBBC Senior Correspondent‖ quoted Nic 
Perkin, President and founder of Receivables Exchange (an electriconic 
marketplace which allows business to sell outstanding invoices): 
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Business is up 300 percent so far this year, said Perkin. "We're growing 
pretty close to as fast as we can."  
Cohn added that Perkin believed that this was due to the hurricane:  
Obviously, a human tragedy," added Perkin. But he believes it "permanently 
changed" Louisiana's business climate, by eliminating bureaucracies and 
spurring a plethora of tax credits (Cohn, 2010). 
However, the poor areas that were affected so badly are only slowly being 
repaired. In 2012 only about 5,500 people live in the Lower Ninth Ward 
compared with four times that many in 2000.   This mostly empty neighbourhood 
still has no police station, supermarket or hospital (Brown, 2012). 
Cohn (2010) makes the point: 
In places like Gentilly‘s Pontchartrain Park and the Lower Ninth Ward, 
where Brad Pitt‘s eco-friendly ―Make it Right‖ homes seem to pop out of 
nowhere, are splashes of new development. 
But there is also the Ninth Ward intersection of Louisa and Law, which we 
have visited repeatedly over the years. Once, it was the epicenter of a 
neighbourhood-within-a neighbourhood, with a school, church and small 
snack shop.    
All that has reopened is the church, but the giant stained glass window over 
the entrance—which residents used to escape into a raft—is bricked over. 
Few residents have returned, and the school was eventually torn down. 
Many of the homes, or what is left of them, have barely changed since the 
waters receded five years ago.  
The Make it right foundation of New Orleans, is a foundation established in 2006 
by the actor, Brad Pitt, and is dedicated to rebuilding New Orleans.  Over 4000 
homes were destroyed by Hurricane Katrina in the New Orleans lower 9th ward.  
The foundation in 2006, announced it would build 150 homes that would be safe 
and storm resistant, affordable, green and healthy for families in the Lower 9th 
Ward who were displaced by Hurricane Katrina.  Funded by an initial 
commitment by Brad Pitt to match five million dollars in contributions to the 
project, the Make It Right foundation completed 75 homes by 2011 and is 
working on completing the second half of the project (Make it right, 2012). 
While housing was the obviously the most prominent issue arising from the 
devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the issues of healthcare is an on-going issue for 
New Orleans. 
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Health 
Health care in New Orleans faced a variety of political, economic and social 
challenges that contributed to the health-care issues.  
before the storms hit, Louisiana ranked lowest overall in the country. 
. . . It numbered among the five worst states for infant mortality, 
cancer deaths, prevalence of smoking, and premature 
deaths. . . . Louisianans also had among the nation‘s highest rates 
of cardiovascular deaths, motor vehicle deaths, occupational 
fatalities, infectious diseases, and violent crime (United Health Foundation 
Report, 2004, quoted in Hartman & Squires, 2009, p. 498) 
 
Much of city‘s health care system was destroyed, many hospitals were damaged, 
their patients evacuated and thousands of doctors were dislocated.   According to 
Nositter (2011):  
2,500 patients in the drowning city were being evacuated because at least 
seven hospitals in Orleans Parish were threatened by the loss of their power 
generators and other problems (p. 1).   
With New Orleans being home to one the nation‘s large uninsured population and 
having extreme poverty rates especially among Afro-Americans, who form most 
of the city‘s population, the citizens of New Orleans depend heavily on a handful 
of healthcare providers and clinics of last resort.  An important provider was the 
New Orleans Charity Hospital which was badly damaged and closed.  
Following the storm health care personal and emergency services worked 
effectively to establish triage centres in several parts of the city:  The Louis 
Armstrong New Orleans International Airport was used as a triage centre and a 
temporary morgue; empty commercial parking lots were used to construct mobile 
treatment centres for patients who required attention and the navy deployed 
hospital ships to the New Orleans seaport (Moller, 2005; Romano, 2005; Upshaw 
2005). 
The Louisiana State Government acted promptly to ensure that its Medicaid 
program continued serving beneficiaries, for example, temporary cards were 
issued for those who lost theirs during the hurricane (Baumrucker et al., 2005) 
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Federally, a strategy  was developed to provide health services for the Katrina 
affected low-income residents but eventually Congress disagreed on the program 
as the Bush administration favoured a state-focused approach and consequently 
Medicaid ―waivers‖ were introduced (Baumrucker et al., 2005; Park, 2005). 
Medicaid waivers are designed to allow states to be flexible in providing health 
care options and eligibility for citizens, allowing states to save money and patients 
to have more freedom of choice (Wisegeek, 2012). The waiver cover included the 
uninsured and selected groups that evacuated from the host state because of the 
storm. 
There were high rates of illness, especially among children who had been 
displaced by Katrina.  A news article published by the New York Times showed 
that children who were displaced and lived in the state‘s biggest trailer parks 
showed high rates of anaemia because of sub-standard diets (Louisiana : High 
Anaemia Rates, 2008).  
Mental health problems have been rife, with a notable rise in suicides. A study of 
trailer park residents reported a rate of major depression more than seven times 
the national rate of 6.7 percent, and 20 percent reported having contemplated 
suicide (Hartman & Squires, 2009, p.498) 
In 2008, there were still displaced families living in trailers that were provided by 
FEMA as temporary accommodation. Those trailers were a health hazard to its 
occupants as they were built quickly with low-quality control and contained high 
quantity of formaldehyde in its material. Formaldehyde is a colourless, strong-
smelling gas. It is used to make building materials and household products. 
Formaldehyde is used to make walls, cabinets, and furniture (CDC, 2012, pg. 1). 
The exposure of formaldehyde in those trailers caused its occupants to have 
serious eye, lung, and nose irritation, given the hot and humid weather in New 
Orleans (Harman & Squires, 2009).  
FEMA clearly knew about this gas and its health impacts, but decided to ignore 
alerts coming from its own health workers. What was even more disturbing is 
FEMA‘s open auction to sell 11,000 of these trailers as they were no longer 
needed for emergency purposes and an additional 864 were sold to resident 
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evacuees.  This is only one of the many indications of how the agency worked 
with people that were vulnerable. 
As mentioned above the Reverend Avery C Alexander Charity Hospital was 
permanently closed.  According to K Brad Ott (2012), the hospital administrative 
operator, Louisiana State Hospital: 
backed by Louisiana state officials, took advantage of the mass internal 
displacement of New Orleans‘s populace in the aftermath of Hurricane  
Katrina in an attempt to abandon Charity Hospital‘s iconic but neglected 
facility and to supplants its original safety net mission serving the poor and 
uninsured for its neoliberal transformation to favour LSU‘s academic 
medical enterprise (p. vii). 
Space does not allow for a full discussion but the Charity hospital and its sister 
campus University Hospital (known together as the Medical Center of Louisiana 
at New Orleans (MCLNO) had been under threat for a number of years prior to 
the hurricane as state authorities attempted to  redirect its main DHS funding 
away from the Charity System (Ott,2012 p.66).  In May 2005 the closure and 
replacement of the hospitals was proposed: 
Due to years of deferred maintenance, lack of reinvestment in facilities and 
changes in privacy regulation MCLNO is housed in hopelessly outmoded 
facilities.   Without action, MCLNO will likely lose its facility accreditation.  
The loss of this accreditation will cause MCLNO to fail to meet its mission 
of providing healthcare access to the uninsured; resulting in the 
redistribution of the area‘s medically indigent to New Orleans‘s other 
hospitals at a potentially higher cost to the state (Adams, 2005, p. 7). 
 
The basements of the Charity and University hospitals were flooded resulting in 
electrical switchgears being swamped.  Conditions rapidly deteriorated and the 
hospitals left with electricity, air conditioning or running water. About 370 
patients were evacuated from the two hospitals, some of them to the more 
fortunate Tulane Medical Center: 
One of the most dramatic, and horrible, examples of the inequality of the 
disaster was that of Charity Hospital, where 600 patients and medical staff 
were trapped for more than 4 days behind torrents of sewerage and 
contaminated water, cut off from electrical power, clean water and medical 
supplies.  While Charity, the largest public hospital in Louisiana, went 
without relief…the private facility across the street, Tulane University 
Medical Center, hired 20 private helicopters to evacuate its 1400 patients 
and family members (Loewenberg, 2005, p. 881) 
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In the second week of September the Charity hospital Emergency Department 
staff and personnel from the U.S. Army Special Forces worked to restore power 
and cleanup the hospital.  At first authorization was given to proceed with the 
clean up, the Emergency Department doctors were warned not to admit patients. 
(Moises, 2009b).   Despite the fact that three floors were clean and ready for use, 
―LSU, backed by state officials, order an end to all efforts to reopen Charity 
Hospital‖ (Johnson 2009, p5).  The LSU officials threatened to charge hospital 
workers with criminal trespassing if they attempted to return to work.  ―Charity 
Hospital was then permanently closed by September, 30, 2005‖ (Moises 2009b, 
p.12) 
Eight years after Katrina, Charity Hospital will be replaced by a new University 
Medical Centre, one with a different financial model that would appeal more to 
insured patients. Adjacent to the New University Medical centre will be the New 
Veterans Affairs Medical Centre that is set to be completed by 2015.  No longer 
will there be the iconic Charity Hospital of previous times. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RECOVERY PROCESS - CHRISTCHURCH 
On the 4th September 2010, Christchurch was hit by a 7.1 magnitude earthquake 
which caused damage to several houses and buildings in Christchurch. Ongoing 
aftershocks to the city and its surroundings caused further damage. Just as people 
were recovering from the 2010 Darfield Earthquake, a magnitude 6.3 earthquake 
(technically an aftershock of the earlier quake) hit the City on the 22nd of 
February, 2011, causing buildings to collapse and further damage to properties 
that had already been damaged by the previous earthquake. 
Housing  
Housing in Christchurch is still an ongoing issue with reports of people being still 
homeless after more than a year since the February 2011 earthquake.  
Early indications after the quake showed that at least 10,000 homes would be 
demolished and 100,000 homes needed to be repaired (Bennet & Leask, 2011).  
By March 3rd, 2011, 56,000 properties had been inspected by building engineers 
who placed yellow or red stickers to restrict access due to safety reasons. 
Inspection of buildings in New Zealand uses a building safety tagging procedure 
(similar to the one in the U.S.) using three different colours: green (safe and 
inspected), yellow (restricted use) and red (unsafe). 
The quake caused only limited structural damage to houses, but non-structural 
damage was extensive. Non-structural components are those things that do not 
support the building, for example, shattered glass, shelves, furniture etc. (Lexic, 
2012). In Christchurch, the tremor caused chimney failure, brick fences to 
collapse, cracks in walls and other damage which is common to quakes of this 
magnitude, and accounted for major dollar losses. 
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Photo 3: Non-structural damage caused by the 2011 Christchurch earthquake.  
(Photo taken: 03/8/2012 by Sue Chaytor) 
 
Most structural damage in Christchurch was caused by soil liquefaction and land 
instability (EERI, 2011). This caused major damage to properties, particularly 
those that are situated along the Avon River and the eastern coastal suburbs. Many 
houses were deemed beyond repair due to severe liquefaction and as a result, 
houses were abandoned. The worst hit suburbs in Christchurch, according to a 
press release from a 3 news website, were Bexley, Avondale, Horseshoe Lake, 
Burwood, Dallington and Avonside (Garner, 2011).  
 
Photo 4: An abandoned street beside Avon River in Christchurch 2012. Seen in 
the background is a truck driving towards a construction site to load up demolition 
debris.  (Photo taken: 03/8/2012 by Sue Chaytor). 
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Photo 5: A house in Kaiapoi moved on its foundation in both the September 
and February earthquakes a total of 1.8m (photo: Lai).   Source (EERI, 2011). 
 
As of the 6th of August 2012, New Zealand‘s Earthquake commission (EQC) had 
received 459,195 claims of which 414,064 of them were building claims.  
According to the Scorecard, a total number of 20,007 home repairs and 45,920 
urgent repairs were completed. A total amount of $3,257,145,068 was paid out to 
insured homeowners (Earthquake Commission, 2012). 
On the 22nd of June 2011, geotechnical engineers prepared a map for the 
government of greater Christchurch divided into four residential zones – red , 
orange, white and green.  
 
Map 2:  Map of Greater Christchurch released on the 23rd June 2011.  The map 
shows how Greater Christchurch is divided into different coloured residential 
zones (CERA: 2012). 
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The four different colour zones represented in Map 1 have their own classification. 
Properties located in the red zone for example, Avondale and Burwood have wide 
land and infrastructure damage, and are considered unsafe for residential purposes. 
Repairs to the land have been deemed to be costly, uncertain and highly disruptive 
by on-going aftershocks and therefore should be abandoned (CERA, 2012).  
 
 Map 3: Map of the different zones in Christchurch as of the 29th June 2012. 
(CERA: 2012).  
 
Properties across the orange zone had to wait for further assessment. As of the 
29th of June 2012, the properties in the orange zone have been rezoned to either 
green or red, for example, Parklands (green), Redcliff and Southshore (red) as 
shown in Map 2  (CERA, 2012). 
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 Map 4: Map shows the red and white zone areas in Port Hills as of 29th June 
2012. (CERA, 2012). 
The White zone areas as shown in Map 1 and 3 have complicated geotechnical 
issues relating to landslips and rock roll, and will require further assessment and 
observation before any decision is made, for example, Port Hills as shown in map 
3. 
The green zone areas across Christchurch are considered suitable for residential 
construction depending on the status of the land, council consent requirements, 
on-going seismic activity and foundation guidelines. 
The foundation technical categories (TC1, TC2 and TC3), are placed across the 
green zone. They represent areas that could possibly be affected by liquefaction in 
future quakes. The higher the category number, the larger the damage that could 
be caused by liquefaction. For the areas that are in the N/A category, normal 
consenting procedures apply. (CERA, 2012). Following is a map showing the 
technical categories in Christchurch.  
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Map 5: Map depicting the different residential technical categories in 
Christchurch as of March 2012. (CERA, 2012). 
 
Red Zone Residents 
The residents in the red zone had the choice of accepting one of two options 
offered by the Crown. The first option according to CERA (2012) was: 
the purchase price paid for your property will be based on the most recent 
rating valuation for your land, buildings and fixtures and the Crown will 
take over all insurance claims for the damage to your property.  
The second option: 
the purchase price paid for your property will be the most recent rating 
valuation for your land and the Crown will take over your EQC claim for 
land damage only. You will retain the benefit of all insurance claims for the 
damage to your buildings and fixtures and will continue to deal with EQC 
and your insurer to settle those claims (CERA, 2012).   
 
For the people who wished to accept one of these two options, applicants had to 
complete a consent form with details about their property, insurance from the 
Earthquake Commission (EQC) and their own insurer. The consent forms had to 
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be completed and sent to CERA before the 31st March 2012 authorizing EQC and 
the insurer to share this information with the Crown. 
The Crown offer was extended to include dwellings that were under-construction 
in the residential red zone, and owners of not-for-profit, non-residential buildings 
in the red-zone (CERA, 2012). 
The Crown offer only included the insured properties in the red-zone and 
excluded the uninsured. The uninsured homes in Christchurch are, according to 
CERA‘s boss, Roger Sutton, ―less than 50, so that is relatively a small number‖ 
(Clark, 2011). Some people showed discontent with people who were uninsured 
and pointed out that people who were insured should be recovered first. 
According to TV3 News, Local MP, Brendon Burns said those with insurance 
must come first (Clark, 2011).   Some residents who kept up with their insurance 
showed little or no sympathy for their uninsured neighbours. 
 A group of Christchurch and Canterbury residents called the ‗Quake Outcasts‘ 
are appealing to the red zone owners to write to the Queen requesting justice and 
the upholding of New Zealand and international law regarding private property 
ownership.   The group claims that the: 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority and the Minister for Earthquake 
Recovery have proven to be unwilling or unable to respond to repeated cries 
for fair treatment, and owners of uninsured homes and empty sections that 
are red-zoned by CERA are not even being offered a buyout (The Real 
Recovery, 2012). 
 
Temporary housing  
Immediately after the first earthquake emergency accommodation was required.  
A number of people who were displaced sheltered in welfare centres at different 
points in Christchurch like Linwood high School, Cowles Stadium, Burnside 
Welfare Centre, Addington Raceway Centre and Kaiapoi Rugby Football 
clubrooms (NZSEE, 2012).   On the 5th of September, an estimated 200 people 
were housed in shelters while others relied on friends and family, or stayed in 
motels and hotels (Staff Writers, 2010).  Those who needed economic assistance 
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received assistance through Housing New Zealand, the Red Cross and other non-
governmental organizations.  
It was not until the 18th February, five months after the 2010 Darfield earthquake 
and three days before the much more destructive quake in 2011 that the 
government introduced a larger-scale, long-term solution.   The Earthquake 
Recovery Minister (Gerry Brownlee) announced that the package included the 
establishment of temporary financial accommodation assistance to help cover 
accommodation costs for homeowners who had to leave their homes. 
The temporary accommodation service will provide a safety net for those 
who are unable to facilitate their own rental accommodation by matching 
their needs with available properties‖ (National Party, 2011).    
Financial assistance was to be available to homeowners whose homes were 
extensively damaged and would take so long to rebuild or repair that their private 
insurance would run out.   
Most people have six or twelve months of temporary accommodation cover under 
their insurance policy, but the size and scale of this event means the recovery 
process will take longer than that  ( National Party, 2011). 
Administered by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) and the Department 
of Housing (DBH) and funded by the Canterbury Earthquake Temporary 
Accommodation Service (CETAS), the benefit was to be universal and not subject 
to any income or asset testing (National Party, 2011).  
The government has said all along we are committed to supporting the 
people of Canterbury during the recovery from this devastating earthquake 
and this announcement further delivers on that intention (National Party, 
2011). 
On the 22nd February 2011, the 6.3 jolt caused widespread damage to houses 
around Christchurch increasing the demand for temporary housing solutions. That 
night  an estimated 1000 people stayed in welfare centres set up at Burnside High 
school and Hagley Park in Christchurch City Central (One News , 2011). 
On the 4th of March 2011, representatives from the Department of Housing 
(DBH), Civil Defence, Emergency Management (CDEM) and the Christchurch 
City Council (CCC) formed a working group to respond to the short and medium 
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term housing issues. The group‘s responsibility was to establish, develop, and 
activate a plan for providing transportable, self-contained accommodation for 
residents displaced by the quake, and find options for emergency and medium 
term temporary accommodation (NZSEE, 2012). 
By April 2011, The Department of Building and Housing New Zealand (DBH) 
had provided more than 350 campervans as temporary housing at the Canterbury 
Agricultural Park until August 2011.  The campervans were not free of charge, 
and they ranged in price from $190 per week for two people up to $337 for six 
people (NZPA, 2011).  As a result all but 65 of the campervans were returned to 
the hire company and only two of these were occupied (Heather, 2011).   
By mid-April 2011, contracts were awarded to three housing providers (a 
consortium of Hawkin/ Spanbild/Fulton Hogan, Jennian Homes and New Zealand 
Transportable Units) to build portable dwellings as a longer term (up to 2 years) 
accommodation (DBH, 2011). People who wanted this particular kind of dwelling 
on private sections had to meet certain criteria, for example, homeowners had to 
pay certain installation costs and live in them for a minimum period of six months.   
The Canterbury Earthquake Temporary Accommodation services (CETAS), 
began working after a two month halt due to the quake, and took over services 
from Housing New Zealand.  CETAS arranged temporary houses for those 
affected by the quake and was responsible for managing the allocation of 
temporary accommodation, coordination of social services and financial 
assistance for housing (Environment Canterbury, 2011).  
In May 2011, to meet the demand for temporary housing,  the Department of 
Housing confirmed three sites for villages of portable homes of which two were in 
Christchurch  (Linwood Park and Rawhiti Domain village) and one in Kaiapoi.  
The Kaipoi Domain Village was ready by July 2011 with twenty-two temporary 
units (Christchurch City Council, 2011). The Linwood Park Village in 
Christchurch was ready by August 2011 with forty-one units.  Rawhiti Village 
was completed in July 2012 with a total number of twenty-two units. The units, a 
mix of two, three and four unfurnished units were fully serviced with town water 
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supply, sewerage and storm water drains, rubbish collection, power and telephone 
lines (CETAS, 2012) 
Health 
Psychological Effects After An Earthquake 
When an earthquake strikes a particular area, violent tremors can cause serious 
structural damage to buildings. People can be killed, injured, trapped under rubble; 
they may witness the injury or death of others and lose property.  Emotional 
reactions such as fear, helplessness and disorientation occur during an earthquake 
and this is linked to death from cardiac arrest and extreme behaviours that are 
caused by panic.  After an earthquake, the effects are seen as being categorized 
into three distinct phases: the acute, the medium-term and the long term. 
The Acute  
This phase occurs generally a few days or a few weeks after a major earthquake. 
In this phase, the affected communities focus on rescuing those who have been 
trapped under the rubble, caring for the injured, analysing the extent of the 
damage, and focus on how to manage and address the problems caused by the 
earthquake. Survivors bury their loved ones, and those who lose their homes seek 
temporary accommodation.  Ongoing aftershocks may lead to further damage to 
building and casualties. People may avoid entering damaged homes due to safety 
reasons and fear of further earthquakes.  Government and relief organizations set 
up tents and prefabricated housing sites in order to accommodate the homeless 
survivors. Little is known about the psychological status of survivors in the acute 
phase aftermath of a major earthquake. Livanou and Basoglu (2007), refer to 
studies that involve assessments one to four weeks post-earthquake that were 
based on convenience and clinical samples and stated: 
increased rates of symptoms of acute stress disorder (dissociative symptoms, 
re-experiencing, avoidance of trauma reminders, and anxiety or increased 
arousal and depression (p. 740). 
Medium Term Effects 
Medium term effects occur approximately one year after a major earthquake. 
Many quake survivors face difficulties in coping with the day-today duties. This is 
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related to either previous or ongoing issues like the loss of loved ones, injury, 
homelessness, material loss, relocation and other quake related stressors (Livanou 
& Basoglu, 2007). Ongoing aftershocks in an affected zone may lead to the 
increase in the levels of traumatic stress. In addition, evidence shows that 
earthquakes can lead to an increase in the rate of generalized anxiety disorder and 
alcohol abuse (Livanou & Basoglu, 2007). 
Long-term effects 
Long–term effects of an earthquake may vary depending on the magnitude and 
severity of the quake. Studies have shown that survivors of serious earthquakes 
often show significantly higher rates of psychopathology than the survivors from 
minor earthquakes. This is because survivors from a major earthquake may 
experience different kinds of traumatic stressors such as physical injury, being 
trapped under rubble, witnessing unpleasant scenes while rescuing others and 
other related stressors. 
Many people were psychologically affected by the two Christchurch earthquakes 
of 2010 and 2011.     The ongoing aftershocks (between September 4 th, 2010 and 
13th October, 2012 there had been 10,809 quakes (Christchurch Quake Map)) and 
people seeking insurance recovery were the two main reasons for people seeking 
counselling at help centres. A media release published in the Rebuild Christchurch 
Website reported that many people who visited the ―Durham Centre‖, which is 
organized by a group of psychological counsellors in Christchurch, ―complained 
of nightmares, flashbacks, fear, eating disorders, relationship issues, and increased 
alcohol use‖ (Media3News, 2012).  
Another article published by ―The Press‖ stated that ―Fifteen months on from the 
Christchurch killer earthquake, the demand for counselling for stress related 
issues shows no signs of easing‖ (Cairns, 2012). The article stated that Pegasus 
Health, which supports 95 health centres in the Canterbury region, was receiving 
an average of 100 referrals per week to its mental health liaison and health 
services. In addition, the article stated that before the quakes, patients were 
predominantly women and accounted for 70% of the service workload. After the 
quakes children and older people are seeking help (Cairns, 2012). 
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 A further news article reported the effect of cold weather in winter:  
Freezing temperatures, draughty quake damaged homes; overcrowding and 
exasperation with the repair agencies will take a toll on the physical and 
mental health on Cantabrians this winter (Eleven, 2012). 
Two further issues related to stress following the earthquakes are the increase in 
cases of anger management and the rise in the divorce rate.  The Petersgate 
Counselling Centre had seen an increase in the number of people seeking help 
(Stewart, 2012). Struan Duthie, director of the clinic, said that ―men in particular 
find it hard to express sadness and disappointment‖ and added that ―this sadness 
often transformed into trouble within relationships and domestic violence‖ 
(Stewart 2012). Duthis claimed that some of the triggers for these anger related 
issues included the loss of business, strained relationships and living with relatives. 
In the seven months to July 2012 there were 600 applications to the Family Court 
for divorce.  This is compared to a total of 716 for 2011.   Reasons for this 
increase include ongoing aftershocks, job losses, increased work hours or one 
person wanting to leave Christchurch while their partner preferred to stay 
(Carville, 2012). Other reasons include ―life-changing decisions being made on a 
daily basis, such as housing, insurance and a change of suburbs, communities and 
schools‖ (Carville, 2012). 
Business Recovery 
The earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 have altered Christchurch in many ways not 
only causing physical changes in the landscape of Canterbury and disruptions in 
the lives of those living in Canterbury but it has also had an economic effect.  
While a number of industries in Christchurch have seen an increase in 
employment other industries have suffered a major decline.  The construction, 
primary, transport and utilities sectors have seen employment opportunities rise 
while employment in  industries such as telecommunications, finance, real estate, 
administration and recreation services has decreased dramatically (see figure 2) 
(Department of Labour, 2011).   
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Figure 1:  The net impact on workplaces that have been affected by earthquakes 
by industry.  (Source: Department of Labour, 2011). 
Figure 2 shows the revenue bar across all industries. As shown, the earthquake 
affected all sectors in terms of revenue except for the construction and hospitality 
sectors. The main factor that led to negative revenue was the loss of customers in 
those industry sectors.  
The earthquake of 2010 and 2011 damaged commercial buildings in Christchurch 
CBD, forcing many employers to find new locations for their businesses in order 
to keep operating. Some businesses were able to re-establish in a new location. 
While small businesses had the flexibility to move to a new location, for others, it 
was very hard to move and relocation was not an option.  Factories with large and 
expensive machinery (for example, The Marmite factory – see below) have had 
more difficulty in re-locating and re-starting production.  
In March 2011, the unemployment rate in Christchurch was 6.4 percent. One year 
later, in March 2012, the rate fell to 5.5 percent and by June 2012, the 
unemployment figures rose again to 6.5 percent in Canterbury due to slow 
economic growth in the country and the financial troubles in European countries 
that made employers cautious about hiring staff (CareersNZ, 2012). 
Because of the need for rebuilding in Christchurch, the number of people 
employed in the construction sector in Canterbury rose to 28 percent with about 
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32,800 employees in the construction sector. The number of employees is 
expected to grow by the end of 2012 and more in 2013 (CareersNZ, 2012). 
The Marmite Case 
Marmite is regarded by New Zealanders as a Kiwi essential. 
It's been two long, cold months as New Zealanders continue to scrape by on 
the dregs at the bottom of the Marmite jar….News of the Christchurch 
Marmite factory's demise sent the country into a spin in March (Kirk, 2012) 
In November 2011, The Marmite Company in Christchurch was closed due to a 
crack in the cooling tower that was caused by the 2011 February earthquake.  
Shortly after closure, supermarkets announced that they were short of stock due to 
the ―Marmegeddon‖ or the panic buying of marmite jars in supermarkets. The 
shortage also led to a plea to the nation to only use Marmite on toast because it 
spreads more thinly, until the factory starts up again (Manhire, 2012).  Many jars 
of Marmite were listed on the online auction website Trademe, for both new and 
used, leading to the dubbing of Marmite as the ―black gold‖.  The retail price for a 
250g jar in the supermarket is normally $4.25, but sellers took advantage of the 
shortage and were asking for $800 per jar.  
The company was expected to re-open and resume production in July 2012, but 
due additional structural damage at the factory, the re-opening was postponed to 
October 2012  (Donnell, 2012).  More than sixty staff were sent home in 
November and are awaiting the resumption of production (TVNZ, 2012). 
Christchurch City Central Recovery Plan 
The Christchurch City Council (CCC), in accordance with the Canterbury 
Earthquake Act (CER Act, 2011), required  the development of a draft recovery 
plan for the Central Business District of Christchurch. Upon completion the draft 
was presented to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, Gerry 
Brownlee, who stressed that the plan could not be approved without amendments 
(Christchurch City Council, 2012).  
The management of the Recovery Plan was passed to a special unit called the 
Christchurch Central Development unit (CCDU) established by the Minister. The 
Recovery Plan was finalized in July 2012 and CCDU will direct its 
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implementation, working together with the City Council, Te Rūnanga o Ngāi 
Tahu and other key stakeholders (Christchurch City Council, 2012). 
During the plan development process, advice on proposed plans was sought from 
different community groups and organizations, with over 106,000 ideas being 
submitted (CCDU, 2012).  According to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery, Gerry Brownlee,   
International examples show that it is important to have a broad and flexible 
plan to guide development and to listen to the voices of the people (2012, p. 
4).   
The Plan‘s proposals are in line with international benchmarks for a major 
city and make the most of the opportunity to revisit the city‘s design. In 
support of the already powerful Canterbury economy, the Plan also commits 
significant resources to develop central Christchurch into a vibrant, well-
formed centre that responds to the needs not just of our generation, but also 
of those that follow. A well-formed and vibrant city centre produces 
economic and social benefits by bringing people together for business, 
cultural or social activities. The result is greater productivity, connectedness, 
development of human capital, sharing of ideas and a shared identity (2012, 
p.3) 
The new city concept is the ―development of a greener more accessible city with a 
compact core and a stronger built identity‖ (CCDU, 2012, p. 7). The plan includes 
new projects, each with their own distinctive feature, to enhance investments, 
growth, and social energy to bring people back to the central city. The 
Christchurch Central Recovery Plan has a range of commercial and residential 
development opportunities with a high quality urban space.  
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority is the leading agency of the 
project with the help of the community‘s vision. The new Recovery Plan and the 
proposed projects reflect the community‘s wishes to replace facilities that have 
been destroyed during the two earthquakes, and enhance more development to 
attract people in order to revitalise urban life on Christchurch (CCDU, 2012).  
The main aim of the Central Recovery Plan is to foster opportunities in the 
Central City for business benefits and demands for attracting investment to 
Christchurch. Both the Central and local governments will have the role of 
restoring confidence in Central Christchurch by relocating their offices to the city 
centre to attract more businesses by providing guaranteed demand.  
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The Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) and the Canterbury Employers‘ 
Chamber of Commerce (CECC) formed a group called the Recovery Canterbury, 
which is responsible for responding to any identified needs of the business 
community in Canterbury. The New Zealand Government acknowledged the work 
of Recovery Canterbury, and granted funding of $2.5 million. The Government 
also gave $1.7 million for the appointment of additional Business Recovery 
Coordinators (Walker, 2011). Some of the activities that have been carried out by 
Recovery Canterbury include the establishment of a dedicated call centre for 
business, the formation of a website as a 24/7 advice centre, the registration of 
over 4000 companies via the website for regular updates and coordination of 
controlled access to business premises inside the cordoned CBD area (Recover 
Canterbury, 2011). 
Discontent 
Many residents in Christchurch are feeling dissatisfaction with the recovery 
operations given that it has been more than one year since the devastating 2011 
quake.  On-going drama with insurance settlements and rebuilding issues are the 
leading factors causing discontent for Christchurch residents. Many residents are 
still battling with insurance companies to get their homes repaired.  This ―merry-
go round‖ with the insurance companies is driving people on the streets to express 
their anger and frustration (Dally, 2012). 
On the 8th of August 2012, some 100 disgruntled residents from the TC3 green 
zone (Shown in blue in map 4 above), braved the rain and rallied in the streets to 
vent their frustration at the communication issues and delays in getting their 
homes repaired by the Earthquake Commission (EQC) and the Insurance 
Australia Group (IAG).  Wider Earthquake Communities Action Network 
(WeCan) spokesman, Mike Coleman, said the weather was "a bit like living in 
your homes - wet, damp, cold, unhealthy" (Dally, 2012). 
The protesters were met by the EQC Chief Executive Ian Simpson and Customer 
Service Manager, Bruce Emsom who took the blame for their ineffective 
communication.  Simpson assured the residents that he would speak to the leaders 
of the company and look at better options (Dally, 2012). 
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IAG insurance company had its front doors closed, but four representatives 
addressed the angry protesters. Chief Executive of the IAG group, Jacki Johnson, 
told the crowd that the company does care and wants to hear what the issues are. 
She urged the crowd to fill out forms given out by IAG in order to do a follow up 
with their issues (Dally, 2012). 
For the rebuilding recovery in the green zones, Canterbury residents frustrated by 
the lack of action on the recovery process held a protest on Saturday the 1st of 
September 2012.  Before the protest, organizer Darla Hutt claimed that those 
affected by the quake were not being heard by officials (McDonald, 2012). 
According to Hutt (2012) ―It's been two years and people are still struggling. They 
are reaching out, but nobody is hearing them‖ (p. 1). Hutt stated that her home and 
other residents houses in technical category 3 (shown in map 3 above) were not fit 
for the cold weather and would not survive  another winter (McDonald, 2012). 
Hutt stated that ―There was the 100-day plan for the rebuild of the central city; 
where's the 100-day plan for the people?" (2012, p. 1). 
More than 300 protesters holding brandished placards marched the streets towards 
an empty lot beside Christchurch council headquarters, demanding answers from 
the Earthquake Commission, CERA and insurance companies (Newstalk ZB, 
2012). The protesters wanted insurance companies to provide them with a firm 
timeframe as to when their homes would be fixed. 
Other frustrations in Christchurch include the increase in the insurance premium 
rates and the costs of renting a property. For most rentals in Christchurch, 
homeowners have properties not earning any money due to earthquake damage 
and red tape and yet have to cover mortgages and other property cost.  
For the insurance premium rates, the costs have gone up due to the fact that 
insurance companies passed some of their claims-risk on to big international 
reinsurance companies. These reinsurers had excessive numbers of claims and 
raised their fees to local insurers. Local insurers in Christchurch have passed the 
higher premiums on to consumers (Consumer, 2012).  The  earthquake has so far 
created $15 billion worth of insurance claims, making it the insurance industry‘s 
third costliest natural catastrophe after Japan‘s Tsunami and the floodings of 
Thailand and Australia in 2011 (Consumer, 2012). 
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Other groups that felt discontent and neglected were the elderly.  In a meeting that 
was held on the 1st of May 2012, with CERA‘s manager, Roger Sutton, the 
elderly residents spoke of how they had been ―totally neglected‖ and left on the 
―bank burner, completely in the dark‖ (Carville, 2012).  The elderly citizens of 
Christchurch called for urgent attention to those living in damaged homes and 
suffering from health problems.  They argued that the elderly should be prioritized 
and many of them feared that they would be dead before their houses were 
repaired (Carville, 2012). 
The meeting organizer, John Patterson, pointed out that it was time for officials to 
listen and said ―we keep getting told we have got to be patient, unfortunately, time 
is not something we can spare‖ (Carville, 2012).  Patterson criticised the city 
plans and said ―people‘s homes are more important than office blocks, convention 
centres and cathedrals even‖ (Carville, 2012). 
According to a news article published in ‗The Press‘ Website, there were a 
number of factors that slowed down the pay out process by insurance companies. 
IAG Head of Recovery, Dean MacGregor, maintained that the slow residential 
settlements were because of the complexity of the residential claims (Steeman, 
2012).   In October, 2012 a number of centres have been set up by the Earthquake 
Commission to process earthquake insurance claims. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Historically, both countries developed quite different approaches to social 
welfare, with New Zealand progressively adopting a ―welfare state‖ and the 
United States promoting a culture of individualism and self-reliance towards 
welfare.   However, in the last thirty years, with the era of neo-liberal economics 
and the third way, New Zealand has moved, at least ideologically, much closer to 
that of the United States.    
While both the United States and New Zealand policy regimes, according to 
Esping- Andersen, fall under the ―liberal category‖ (1991),  the United States 
stresses the intensive use of means tested (residual) welfare and private marked 
based insurance (Myles, 1988) while New Zealand social policy is based 
primarily on a mixture of residualist and rights based models (Boston, Dalziel & 
John, 1999).  
The difference between the ‗residual‘ and ‗institutional‘ welfare described by the 
British social researcher Richard Titmuss, comes close to what is traditionally 
understood by liberal social policy: public intervention occurs only after the two 
traditional sources of support –family and market- break down (Myles, 1988).   
According to Gosta Esping-Andersen (1999), ―The United States epitomizes 
liberalism, yet, the Social security pension scheme has a broad coverage and 
benefits that approach adequacy levels‖ (p. 88).   Public assistance in the United 
States has an extensive set of means-tested benefits, arranged in a hierarchy of 
acceptability and stigma (Hill, 2006).  New Zealand holds a selective welfare 
system and all benefits are means-tested (Hill, 2006). The welfare state benefits 
are modest and targeted, and conform to the residual welfare model (Castles & 
Mitchell, 1993; Castles, 1996). 
However, New Zealand has progressively moved towards different forms of 
targeting via user pays that has impinged upon the universality of key forms of 
welfare and introduced tighter eligibility for many forms of assistance and cuts to 
services that were formally tax-funded (Boston, Dalziel & St John, 1999) 
although this notion may not be accurate in terms of health and education 
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(Bryson, 1992; Esping Andersen, 1990; Jamrozik, 1994).  But as access to state 
assistance narrows (and results in long hospital waiting lists), people opt out of 
public assistance and choose to go with private insurance. The neo-liberal concept 
of individual responsibility which has been a hallmark of United States ideology 
is increasingly becoming an acceptable social policy approach in New Zealand.  
With the understanding that both the United States and New Zealand fall under 
the liberal welfare regime in Esping- Andersen‘s typology, the response to the 
earthquakes in New Zealand was quicker and more efficient than the response to 
Hurricane Katrina in the United States.  This is because the United States places 
more emphasis on individualism and self-reliance than New Zealand although the 
latter is moving towards that kind of trend. What I believe and argue is that, when 
a disaster strikes in the United States, the government will ask ‗what can you do to 
help yourself before I help you?‘, whereas in New Zealand, the government will 
ask ‗how can I help you?‘.    
 
Conclusion 
In every nation with limited or no warning, disasters can strike anywhere, any 
time and in any form (tsunami, earthquake, hurricanes, terrorism, etc.). They 
usually result in multiple fatalities, mass panic and irreparable damage to houses 
and infrastructure. They often have long-lasting political, economic and 
psychological effects, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and 
the two Christchurch earthquakes in New Zealand.  
 
In terms of awareness and preparedness, both countries have adopted similar 
strategies in dealing with disasters, like formulating disaster plans, conducting 
emergency response drills and exercises (for example, the first New Zealand 
Shakeout on the 26
th
 September 2012) and providing training for disaster 
responders and the general public to improve their understanding on how to react 
during a disaster.  In the United States According to Tierney, Lindell & Perry 
(2001), 
The preparedness process begins with hazard and vulnerability analyses that 
attempt to anticipate what problems are likely to occur and proceeds with 
the development of ways to address those problems effectively (p. 27).  
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The main goal is for households, businesses and government agencies to develop 
strategies on how they will respond to the disaster. In New Zealand, under the 
Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, individuals and the community 
are urged to take responsibility for their own safety by being self-reliant and 
prepared for a disaster (CDEM, 2002).   
 
Although both New Zealand and the United States adopt the ‗liberal‘ typology in 
different ways, they both view the individual as responsible for being prepared for 
any kind of disaster, and the readiness to respond will be based on their 
preparations for an event. This includes having a prepared plan, storing food, 
obtaining emergency equipment and supplies, and having knowledge in first aid 
training.  
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